Martin Feldstein says raise taxes, but not rates

While figuring out tax incidence-who actually bears the burden of the tax--is difficult, my guess is that his proposal, which would limit all deductions to two percent of adjusted gross income, would raise revenue, simplify the code, reduce deadweight losses (i.e., economic inefficiency), and produce a more progressive tax code.  It is the last of these that I am not sure about, but if we also raised the top rates to their Clinton-era levels, then one gets a more progressive code too.  I have seen no evidence that raising the top marginal rate from 35 to 39 percent would produce substantial deadweight loss.

I think such a proposal would need to be phased in--it would be a shock to lots of different markets, but I like the thinking behind it.  

My own beef with Trump

The Donald gives people the worst possible impression about the real estate business--the business that I study for a living. It is not principally about slapping your name on a gaudy building. It is about building 3 bedroom houses and apartment buildings; it is about building Targets and, yes, Walmarts; it is about managing class-B office buildings in suburbs; it is about distribution centers in Oconomowoc.  It is about providing environments where the bulk of people live, work, shop and build.  

Sudeep Reddy on Bernanke's Press Conference

He writes (correctly in my view):

This press conference looks like a more intelligent, faster-paced version of a congressional hearing. It's a lot of the same questions -- bond-buying, high oil prices, long-term unemployment -- except you would've gotten five lawmakers making speeches about gas prices before asking a single question. Bernanke looks the same as he does at a hearing. He's not exactly thrilled to be there, but happy to take questions as long as you want.

Wendell Cox on Municipal Boundaries

From comments:

The arbitrariness of the municipal boundaries that drive much of the historical core city and suburb analysis does indeed create significant problems. We commented on this in PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN CORES AND SUBURBS (http://www.newgeography.com/content/002123-perspectives-urban-cores-and-suburbs). 

We concluded: "An eventual more precise analysis of urban cores and suburban trends will be welcome. Yet, as our analysis of trends in New Jersey indicated, even the growth in more urban core oriented municipalities was minuscule compared to the state's suburban growth. Further, much of the urban core growth in the nation came from areas that, although formally located within “city limits” actually were on the suburban fringe. This was true, for example, in Kansas City, Oklahoma City and even Portland. This suggests that the small share of growth reported in urban cores would be even less if it were based on census tract data; and suburbanization, as a way of life, may indeed be even more prevalent than this year’s numbers suggest."

Deborah Popper on "Subtracted Cities"

She writes about how shrinking cities can take control of their destinies, while being realistic about what those destinies imply:

Detroit stands as the ultimate expression of industrial depopulation. The Motor City offers traffic-free streets, burned-out skyscrapers, open-prairie neighborhoods, nesting pheasants, an ornate-trashed former railroad station, vast closed factories, and signs urging "Fists, Not Guns." A third of its 139 square miles lie vacant. In the 2010 census it lost a national-record-setting quarter of the people it had at the millennium: a huge dip not just to its people, but to anxious potential private- and public-sector investors.

Is Detroit an epic outlier, a spectacular aberration or is it a fractured finger pointing at a horrific future for other large shrinking cities? Cleveland lost 17 percent of its population in the census, Birmingham 13 percent, Buffalo 11 percent, and the special case of post-Katrina New Orleans 29 percent. The losses in such places and smaller ones like Braddock, Penn.; Cairo, Ill.; or Flint, Mich., go well beyond population. In every recent decade, houses, businesses, jobs, schools, entire neighborhoods -- and hope -- keep getting removed.

The subtractions have occurred without plan, intention or control of any sort and so pose daunting challenges. In contrast, population growth or stability is much more manageable and politically palatable. Subtraction is haphazard, volatile, unexpected, risky. No American city plan, zoning law or environmental regulation anticipates it. In principle, a city can buy a deserted house, store or factory and return it to use. Yet which use? If the city cannot find or decide on one, how long should the property stay idle before the city razes it? How prevalent must abandonment become before it demands systematic neighborhood or citywide solutions instead of lot-by-lot ones?

Subtracted cities can rely on no standard approaches. Such places have struggled for at least two generations, since the peak of the postwar consumer boom. Thousands of neighborhoods in hundreds of cities have lost their grip on the American dream. As a nation, we have little idea how to respond. The frustratingly slow national economic recovery only makes conditions worse by suggesting that they may become permanent.

Subtracted cities rarely begin even fitful action until perhaps half the population has left. Thus generations can pass between first big loss and substantial action. Usually the local leadership must change before the city's hopes for growth subside to allow the new leadership to work with or around loss instead of directly against it. By then, the tax base, public services, budget troubles, labor forces, morale and spirit have predictably become dismal. To reverse the momentum of the long-established downward spiral requires extraordinary effort.

Fatalism is no option: Subtracted cities must try to reclaim control of their destinies. They could start by training residents to value, salvage, restore and market unused sites and the material found there. They might supplement school drug-free zones with subtraction-action ones by reacting quickly when nearby empty properties show neglect. Children who see debris-filled plots and boarded-up buildings learn not to expect much from life. Just planting a few trees often makes a deserted lot look cared for.

Chris Leinberger, Wendell Cox, Drunks and Lampposts

In a New Republic piece, Chris Leinberger says that Wendell Cox's statement that the census shows that central cities have had a small fraction of urban population growth is beside the point.  He argues, correctly, that the census definitions of urban and suburban are pretty arbitrary: if one is in the City of Los Angeles, she lives in an urban area, if she is in Santa Monica or Beverly Hills or Pasadena, she is in a suburban area.  One visit to LA reveals that this is silly.  Just because the light is there doesn't mean the missing keys are there.

But Leinberger then makes a statement that is also un-illuminating:

Likewise, the suburbs of those core cities include classic subdivisions and McMansions, like the home of Tony Soprano, but they also include booming places like Old Town Pasadena, Reston Town Center near Dulles Airport outside D.C., and revitalized Jersey City and Hoboken, NJ, on the other side of the Hudson River from Manhattan.

I now live in Pasadena, and before that, I lived in Bethesda.  They are both indeed wonderful places (for me anyway); they are also quite "walkable."  But neither strikes me as booming, so I looked up their population growth between 2000 and 2010.  The Bethesda Central Designated Place grew by  a little over 9 percent; Pasadena grew by 2.3 percent.  The country as a whole grew by a little less than 10 percent.  It is hard to make a case for booming.

But perhaps the issue is supply.  If no houses are available, then it is not surprising that population has not grown much.  Ryan Avent has correctly made this point.  But the residential vacancy rates in both Bethesda and Pasadena are in excess of 7 percent--not huge, but not exactly tight either.  And Pasadena's condominium market continues to face serious problems.

Personally, I love the kind a communities Leinberger favors--I seem to live in them.  But  some urbanists engage in hectoring that really bothers me.  Lots and lots of Americans appear to love their cars and their isolated houses.   So long as they interanalize the costs their lifestyle imposes (and I have long been for a tax that puts a floor on gasoline costs), people should be able to live how they like and where they like.

Raphael Bostic on a layered housing problem

He gives an interview here:

There is a triple threat facing the elder African American LGBT population in the Detroit area. Even though small in number, this particular group of people encounters difficulties in finding retirement homes, safety, recognition and financial security. Dr. Raphael Bostic, the assistant secretary of Housing and Urban Development, attended an April 16 summit organized by KICK (an agency for LGBT African Americans) to address such concerns. Dr. Bostic spoke to BTL about discrimination and other issues faced by these elders.

What were the common concerns discussed at the KICK summit?
The elder LGBT population has significant challenges. They don't have children who can offer them help and support. If they are with a partner they often don't have access to their (partner's) pension funds, so they can become extremely vulnerable rather quickly. This is a really important conversation, and a lot of the gay and lesbian elder population has not been a (focus) of that conversation. Somehow they are a hidden population.
Elders in African American communities have difficulties, elders in general have difficulties and LGBT elders have difficulties, so this really overlays three types of groups. We don't really know much about the challenges that this group faces and they are forced to be invisible because sexual orientation and gender identity are not protected classes, so landlords can and do discriminate against these (people). So sometimes they have to go back into the closet. One of the things we are trying work on is how often these issues arise so we can talk about it in an informed way and hopefully get to a place where that kind of discrimination happens a lot less frequently.

Why does S&P matter?

Are they telling us anything about the US fiscal condition that the whole world doesn't know?  Is there anything to suggest that their past insights have been particularly penetrating?  Just wondering...

All advice welcome

I am on a panel on budget issues with Paul Ryan on June 9 in Madison.  Needless to say, I am taking preparation for this very seriously.  I would therefore welcome any thoughts, links, etc. from anyone inclined to send them.  Don't worry if you think I have seen it before--I am looking for a dump of everything right now.

Robert E. Baldwin 1924-2011

He was my dissertation advisor.  From his obituary:

Baldwin was also an "academic father" to scores of students, inspiring them with his quiet but deeply held passion for combining academic rigor with real-world applicability. Many of his students have become professors in universities across the world. His vocation is also carried on by his son, Richard, and son-in-law, Gene Grossman, both of whom are professors of economics specialising in international trade.

I was very fortunate to be among those scores.   

A coincidence?

In 1959, the poverty rate among the elderly was 37.1 percent, or more than double the rate for all adults.  By 1969, it has dropped to 27.1 percent and by 1979 to 12.7 percent.  By 1999 it was 7 percent, or lower than the adult poverty rate.  Medicare, of course, came into being in the 1965.  

Rhonda Porter points out that a government shutdown would stop the mortgage underwriting process.

Lenders will not be able to order 4506Ts--tax transacripts--from the IRS.  This is the principal source of income verification.  Without it, lenders will not be able to underwrite borrowers.

 

Now for Metro Areas (which are harder to define)

The ten largest MSAs in 1960 (SMSA for everything except Chicago and New York, which are CMSAs) with current rank in parentheses.

1. New York (1)
2. Chicago (3)
3. Los Angeles (within a whisker of Chicago) (2)
4. Philadelphia (5)
5. Detroit (11)
6. San Francisco (13)
7. Boston (10)
8. Pittsburgh (!!)  (22)
9. St. Louis (18)
10. Washington (8)

San Francisco is just San Francisco-Oakland--if one added San Jose it would be in the same position in 1960 and further up the ranks now.  I forgot that Pittsburgh was once a top ten MSA.  There is obvously a lot more persistence here.

50 years of Population in in Ten Largest Municipalities in the US

Just for grins, I looked to see how the ten largest cities around the time I was born have changed in terms of rank.  The top ten in 1960 and their current rank:

1. New York (still # 1)
2. Chicago (now 3)
3. Los Angeles (now 2)
4. Philadelphia (now 5)
5. Detroit (now 18)
6. Baltimore (now 21)
7. Houston (now 4)
8. Cleveland (now 45)
9. Washington, DC (now 24)
10. St. Louis (now 58!)

New York is a bit larger now, and has for more than 50 years been more than twice as large as the second largest city, making the spirit of George Zipf happy. LA and Houston have gained population as well as rank; the other seven all lost.  St. Louis is hemmed in by a boundary that was drawn more than a century ago, but it doesn't lack land--the area north of downtown is basically field and forest.  Cleveland, Baltimore and, of course, Detroit have lots of empty space within their boundaries as well.

For symmetry, let's look at where the current top ten were in 1960.

1. New York (1)
2. Los Angeles (3)
3. Chicago (2)
4. Houston (7)
5. Philadelphia (5) (note: the top 5 were all in the top 7 in 1960).
6. Phoenix (29)
7. San Antonio (17)
8. San Diego (18)
9. Dallas (13)
10. San Jose (57)

The cities in the second five moved pretty dramatically.  They all had lots of available land in 1960 and are all, of course, sunbelt (although I suppose on could argue that northern California is not sunbelt).  

Note: All data come from 2010 Census and http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab19.txt.

  

Ryan Avent doesn't believe 2.8 percent unemployment is a reasonable possibility

Ryan Avent on the assumptions underlying the Ryan plan:


http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/04/facts_and_figures

A couple of other points: Ryan seems to think that the two basic problems facing the country are: (1) too many defined benefits and (2) too much equality.

Dalton Conley Talks about Intergenerational Wealth--and it is not pretty

Dalton gave a very nice talk at USC on Friday, presenting his Center for American Progress paper 

Wealth Mobility and Volatility in Black and White.  The CAP page on the paper summarizes the findings:

• What family an individual comes from ƒƒexplains about three-quarters of where they end up in the wealth distribution as adults. For African Americans, however, the impact of family background is substantially lower, at 37 percent.
• Individuals are more likely to mainƒƒtain wealth than to attain wealth, or more precisely, low-wealth children are unlikely to become high-wealth adults, while high-wealth children are very likely to be high-wealth adults. Looking at previous years’ data, less than 10 percent of children who grew up in families in the bottom wealth quartile, which had a maximal cut off of about $8,000 in 1984, reached high wealth levels by adulthood between 1999 and 2003 (when the top group’s minimal value was $82,501and the median was over $189,000). And over 55 percent of children who grew up in families in the top wealth quartile—over $155,000 of net worth back in 1984—held on to their high wealth levels by adulthood.
• The strongest predictor of an adult’s ƒƒrelative wealth status is his or her income, which in turn is highly predicated on his or her parents’ income and wealth.
• Wealthy white children are much more ƒƒlikely to become wealthy adults than wealthy African-American children: Over 55 percent of all white children raised by parents in the top wealth quartile hold onto the top wealth position as adults. This is contrasted to only the 37 percent of African-American children raised by parents in the top wealth quartile who hold onto the top wealth position as adults.

Soon-take Chang Describes South Korea's Countercyclical Housing Finance Policy

His paper is very interesting.  Section 3 begins:

Macroeconomic instability greatly affected the financial crisis in Korea at the end of 1997. The need for macroprudential supervision in Korea was highlighted by the bursting of the credit card bubble in 2003.

During the credit card lending boom, the supervisory authority did not respond adequately to the growth of household delinquencies stemming from the reckless behavior of credit card issuers.

The authority was not sensitive to systemic distress originating from households because its prudential oversight was primarily focused on the soundness of individual financial institutions (Lee, 2006). This case underlined the importance of placing greater emphasis on detecting early warning signs before the build-up of excessive imbalances continued for too long (Kang and Ma, 2009).

After the credit card bubble burst, there was a new, widespread appreciation of macroprudential policy. Mortgage loans had increased sharply since 2000, which undermined the stability of the overall housing market. The supervisory authority has taken steps to prevent overheating in mortgage lending and to minimize the risk of loan default.

First, the supervisory authority raised the risk weighting for mortgage loans. The authority also raised the minimum loan loss reserve ratios for banks’ household and corporate loans that were classified as normal and precautionary in November 2002 and in December 2006.

Second, in 2002, the authority started to reduce the maximum LTV ratio for mortgage loans, from approximately 75 percent to 40 percent in the Seoul metropolitan area.

The authority imposed additional measures, such as a ceiling of 40 percent on the DTI ratio for certain types of borrowers, as well as other restrictions on granting mortgage loans and maturity extensions on existing mortgage loans for properties in the Seoul metropolitan area. These various restrictions on mortgage lending were imposed on both banks and non-banking financial institutions.

Note that Korea's loan terms were conservative by OECD standards even before the tightening.   But given how well Korea's economy has survived the downturn, they may be onto something.

From The New Yorker: Wisconsin: The Cronon Affair

Wisconsin: The Cronon Affair

I was especially taken with this:

Second, the Republicans seem remarkably fragile. A professor writing a blog post gives them the shivers. It’s a good thing they chose politics, and not the kind of career where the going can really get rough. Professors, for example, teach their hearts out to surly adolescents who call them boring in course evaluations and write their hearts out for colleagues who trash their books in snarky reviews. These Wisconsin Republicans may never have survived ordeals like that. Happily, Cronon has been toughened by decades of academic life. He’ll be blogging—and teaching and writing—long after Wisconsin voters have sent these Republicans back to obscurity.

There are days when I wonder if tenure is an anachronism. The Cronon affair strongly suggests to me that it is not.

Shani Hilton on Gentrification in DC

Worth reading....

Confessions of a Black D.C. Gentrifier

The Census estimate for the US for 2009 was less than the Count for 2010

The estimate, at 307,006,550, was .6 percent less than the count of 308,745,538.  Yet for the ten largest cities, the estimate was 4 percent higher than the count.  Again, it would be nice no know whether cities were overestimated in 2009 or undercounted in 2010. 

To finish the previous post's thought.

The 2009 population estimate for Detroit was 821,792.  The 2010 count was 713,777.

Overestimates or Undercounts? Does this mean Detroit didn't lose quite so many people?

When the 2010 census count for New York City came out today, it struck me as a little light.  So I decided to compare the 2009 population estimates for the ten largest cities in the country againt that 2010 counts.  In all cases expect San Diego, the census count was lower than the 2009 estimate.  The average difference was four percent, which is four years of population growth at the national growth rate.  Here are the numbers: the first column of numbers is the 2009 estimate; the second is the 2010 count.  What is going on here?

New York City	8,391,881	8,175,133
Los Angeles	3,831,868	3,792,621
Chicago	2,851,268	2,695,598
Houston	2,257,926	2,099,451
Phoenix	1,593,659	1,445,632
Philadelphia	1,547,297	1,526,006
San Antonio	1,373,668	1,327,407
San Diego	1,306,300	1,307,402
Dallas	1,299,542	1,197,816
San Jose	964,695	945,942

Is Inside Job correct about the corrupting influence of money on the economics profession?

I think it may be, but not in the way implied by the movie.  Charles Ferguson makes a big deal out of the fact that Glenn Hubbard, Frederic Mishkin, Larry Summers and Martin Feldstein were paid well by financial institutions and governments who wound up becoming major contributors to the crisis.  HIs implication is that all of these well-known economists ignored the danger signals arising from financial deregulation because they were well paid to do so.

I really doubt this is true.  I say this because I remember thinking at the time it was passed that Gramm-Leach-Bliley was on net good policy, because is was (1) necessary in order to allow New York to compete with London and (2) I thought people at places like Goldman Sachs (especially Goldman Sachs) were smart and competent and would protect their franchise.  I was, at the time, very impressed with Alan Greenspan and Robert Rubin.    I had no financial stake at all in any of these beliefs, other than the fact that I wanted my kids' college fund and my wife and my retirement fund to do well.

And by all indications, the economy was doing well.  Unemployment fell to historically low levels, the employment to adult population ratio hit its zenith, and low wage workers were seeing increases in income.  I even remember walking to work in Madison in 1999 or so, and thinking to myself, "could the economy get any better than it is?"  I am thus in no position at call to complain about others having the same view.  All this said, Ferguson was spot on when he called for economists to disclose financial interests that might in any way be related to their research.

But the problem, I think, is far more insidious.  For people who are both successful and reflective, there must often be an undercurrent of doubt as to whether the success is "deserved:" is it a product of virtue or of luck. The neoclassical paradigm allows successful people to feel good about themselves.  It is not much of a leap to infer from it the proposition that people in a neoclassical world can make their own choices, and that when they make "good"choices, they are rewarded, and when they make "bad" choices, they are not.  The number of important choices available to us are, however, limited.  I try to remember that I did not get to choose the country where I was born, I did not get to choose that I had loving, well-educated parents, I did not get to choose that I grew up in a safe community, and I did not get to choose that I have never been seriously ill.  The problem with economics, I think, is not the money people take from various countries and companies, but a broader lack of reflection on the circumstances that produce outcomes.

To me the most disturbing aspect of Inside Job is not the revelation of consulting relationships, but the fact that the economists interviewed by Ferguson seem not to have changed their view of the world even a little.      Feldstein's statement that he had "no regrets" about AIG was the ultimate expression of this.    

Planes, Trains, Automobiles, George Will and Paul Krugman

I haven't blogged in awhile, so I am catching up a little....

Paul Krugman writes two blog posts about rail, one of which I like, and one of which I don't.

This one is, I think, correct:

Oh, boy — this George Will column (via Grist) is truly bizarre:

So why is America’s “win the future” administration so fixated on railroads, a technology that was the future two centuries ago? Because progressivism’s aim is the modification of (other people’s) behavior.

Forever seeking Archimedean levers for prying the world in directions they prefer, progressives say they embrace high-speed rail for many reasons—to improve the climate, increase competitiveness, enhance national security, reduce congestion, and rationalize land use. The length of the list of reasons, and the flimsiness of each, points to this conclusion: the real reason for progressives’ passion for trains is their goal of diminishing Americans’ individualism in order to make them more amenable to collectivism.


As Sarah Goodyear at Grist says, trains are a lot more empowering and individualistic than planes — and planes, not cars, are the main alternative to high-speed rail.

And there’s the bit about rail as an antiquated technology; try saying that after riding the Shanghai Maglev.


But anyway, it’s amazing to see Will — who is not a stupid man — embracing the sinister progressives-hate-your-freedom line, more or less right out of Atlas Shrugged; with the extra irony, of course, that John Galt’s significant other ran, well, a railroad.

Will nowadays seems to get the vapors over anything like a public good.  Air travel is indeed the alternative to rail, and it really is awful. The Acela in the Northeast is often prefrable to air travel, and my understanding is that it is profitable.  Perhaps similar quality service from, say, San Diego to Ventura County, along with a few other high density corridors, would work (I am skeptical about the ability of high speed rail to compete with Southwest Airlines, but let's leave that for another time).  Cars, moreover, do indeed produce environmental damage and congestion that is not priced properly,  European gas taxes and Singaporean congestion fees make lots of economic sense.  One could even use the revenue to hold low-income people harmless from the increased cost of auto transporation.

But in his next blog post, Krugman says:

And don’t get me started on how much more freedom of movement I feel in New York, with subways taking you almost everywhere, than in, say, LA, where you constantly have to worry about parking and traffic.

Well, trains take you almost everywhere on the West Side of Manhattan.  The trains are also mostly radial lines into Manhattan--try going from someplace in Queens to someplace in Brooklyn, and you will see that trains are not so wonderful.  Look, I think the New York City Subway System (and Metro North and the Long Island Rail Road and Path), are great things, but I am not sure how "liberating" it is to live in New York is you can't afford to live in Manhattan. My daughters lived in Brooklyn last summer, and getting around was not a walk in the park for them (except when they walked through a nearby park).

So I decided to look at American Community Survey Data (click on the spreadsheet) comparing the benighted among us who live in LA with those liberated New Yorkers.  The mean travel time for workers in Los Angeles County is 29 minutes.  In New York County it is 30 minutes.  In the four boroughs outside of Manhattan, it is 42 minutes in Kings, Queens, and Richmond Counties, and 41 minutes in Bronx County.  In metropolitan Los Angeles, 11 percent have a one-way commute of more than one hour; in metropolitan New York, almost 20 percent have such a long commute.  


[Update: in response to Minka's comment, I looked up the average one-way commute in metro San Francisco--it is the same as LA.  As for LA being a cultural wasteland, anyone who would say that after living here is willfully ignoring the music, theater and restaurant scene here.  LA is also far more diverse than San Francisco, which for me makes it a more interesting city.]

 


.

Mike Lea and Tony Sanders diss the 30 year fixed rate mortgage

They do so in a paper.  I think Mike and Tony are smart guys.  But I think their reasoning is flawed here..

They basically argue that Fannie and Freddie were responsible for the 30-year fixed rate mortgage, and that they have been a catastrophe, and that therefore the 30-year fixed rate mortgage was a catastrophe.  But had FF done two things--stuck to prime 30-year fixed rate mortgages and matched the duration of their liabilities to the duration of their assets by using callable debt--they almost certainly would not have imploded.

FF imploded because they invested in AAA tranches of low quality mortgages (which were originated and securitized in the private sector) and Alt-A mortgages, and because they had to roll over too much short-term debt in 2008.

Lea and Sanders also argue that there is "nothing special about housing finance."  I am not sure I agree.  It is the one method households have to take on large amounts of leverage, and households are not in the position to hedge risk (not that our financial institutions proved to be particularly good at hedging).  

James Madison Harris 1915-2011

My father-in-law, James Madison Harris, died on Feb 26, 2011. As a young man in the Philippines, he was a cliff-diver. He played baseball and soccer professionally, and recorded 13 holes in one on the golf course. He was in the Army Signal Corp during World War II, and was a boilermaker on the Southern Pacific Railroad. He was in the railroad union and he played the violin. He was married to Flora Harris for 59 years. He was kind to everyone, and had a hell of a fine daughter.

Why aren't there more foreclosures in Europe?

Dwight Jaffee shows that mortgage foreclosures in Europe are still rare, even in distress countries such as Spain and the United Kingdom.  The question is why.  I have heard people in seminars suggest that it is because of recourse--it is ubiquitous in Europe.  But perhaps it is because the social safety net in Europe is stronger.   When Americans lose their jobs, it is hard for them to make mortgage payments.  When Europeans lose their jobs, it is still hard, but perhaps less so than in the US.  Just a thought....

Why I admire Mark Zandi

He work is speedy enough to be of use to the business community and policy debates; his work is rigorous enough to be credible.  He also doesn't take himself too seriously.  This short piece in Slate sums him up nicely.

Joel Kotkin cannot find evidence of a "Back to the City" movement

He puts together a table of suburban and core urban growth based on 2000 and 2010 census data.

MSA                   Core Growth                         Suburban Growth                             Total Growth

Austin	20.4%	56.1%	37.3%
Baltimore	-4.6%	9.9%	6.2%
Chicago	-6.9%	9.0%	3.9%
Dallas-Fort Worth	0.8%	30.2%	23.4%
Houston	7.5%	39.3%	26.1%
Indianapolis	5.0%	28.3%	15.2%
San Antonio	16.0%	43.7%	25.2%
Washington	5.2%	16.8%	15.4%
Total	3.2%	21.7%	15.7%

These are places for which the Census had released data by mid-February. Some of the places for which data has been released since then--St. Louis, Las Vegas and Birmingham--have the same pattern: in all cases suburban growth has outpaced central city growth. St. Louis' population has dropped to its lowest level since 1870.

The results seem particularly surprising for Chicago and Washington, which have had successful redevelopment in their urban cores. But redevelopment can actually reduce density. Gentrification often means that wealthy households rehabilitate mult-family properties into single family homes. This can lead to an increase in wealth in cities, but does not necessary translate into a relative increase in population.

I have long rooted for cities (although I confess that I myself live in an "urban" suburb). But facts are facts, and the facts from the 2010 census at this point do not support the idea of a reversal from suburbanization to urbanization.

From my daughter's blog: Hannah in Paris: Politics or nostalgia? » North by Northwestern

Hannah in Paris: Politics or nostalgia? » North by Northwestern

Property rights and time

When I moved to LA a bit more than two years ago, I bought a dryer.  Last week, the heating element went out.  The good news is that the dryer is still under warranty.  The bad news is that when the repair guy came to my house, he didn't have the part to fix it.  As I result, someone needs to be home a second time for the machine to get repaired.

The store from which I bought the dryer will only tell you what day they will come to do repairs--they won't give you a window of time for the day until the night before.  Consequently, to get a dryer that is under warranty repaired, one might well be required to give up two days. 

Because professors have a lot of flexibility in their jobs, this is not a huge deal for me.  For my wife, however, who is a phycician, this would be a big deal.  It would also be a big deal for any production or service worker who has little to no control over hours worked. 

The appliance store that sold and will repair the dryer has essetially asserted a property right to its customers' time--it is imposing costs that it is not forced to bear.  I am not sure whether it is true that this is happening over larger and larger swaths of the economy, but it sure seems so.  For instance, sometimes when I want to change a plane ticket, I am not allowed to do so on the web.  When I call the airline's number, I am sometimes required to wait on hold for a long time before I can talk to someone.  Now it is possible that the time saved on the web when I use it and the lower cost of airfare makes up for the cost of the dreadful phone service, but I am not sure.

Ryan Avent on Density and Skyscrapers

He writes:

This comparison encourages a lot of people (not necessarily Richard Green) to decide that we don’t need skyscrapers. Defenders of the Washington height limit often fall into this category. But there are two points worth making in response to this. One is that it would be harder to build Paris in America than it would be to build Manhattan. Paris’ tiny streets are more hostile to the automobile than anything in the US, including Manhattan. And Paris has relatively tall buildings over a vast area; it’s easier for me to imagine Washingtonians tolerating 30-story buildings downtown than 10-story buildings in a central neighborhood like Brookland. If you need 10-story buildings in every little Brookland-like neighborhood to generate the same density you achieve with 30-story buildings in a central business district, then you can basically forget about generating high densities in American cities. The NIMBYs are just too strong.


The second point is that Glaeser isn’t directing people to go out and build skyscrapers. He’s not a planner. He’s merely saying that, yes, allowing developers to meet demand with supply will often yield tall buildings, and that’s a good thing. It will increase densities relative to the alternative, supply-limited case, and it will improve affordability relative to the alternative, supply-limited case. People who read Glaeser lauding density and who go on to tout the advantages of Paris get his argument precisely backwards. Because density is good, it’s costly — in terms of the metropolitan economy and affordability — to adopt Parisian limits on growth. Unless your city is one of the architectural jewels of the modern world, and if you live in America it isn’t, you should work very hard to avoid such constraints.

I think the comment about Brookland is very much on point.  At the same time, I can't help but wonder if Washington would be a more attractive and affordable city if it allowed a bunch of six floor buildings almost anywhere, instead of skyscrapers in certain districts.  BTW, I think Washington is close to being one of the architectural jewels of the modern world--its vistas are among its best features.

But now let us consider Los Angeles, another expensive city that has relatively few skyscrapers. Because of regulations arising from seismic concerns, it is very expensive to build steel-framed glass-curtainwall buildings here.   At the same time, while land is expensive in LA, it is nowhere near as expensive as Manhattan.  The combination of high construction costs and (lower) land costs leaves me skeptical about whether high-rise buildings could be economically feasible here.

On the other hand, we should use our land more densely and efficiently here.  Lots of four-to-six story buildings would help.  Maybe narrowing some minor street would help--particularly in the San Fernando Valley and Orange County.

As I said in my original post, high rises are almost certainly the right hammer for very large cities, such as Mumbai, Cairo, Mexico City and Sao [Paulo].  Singapore and Hong Kong have proved that cities that rely on the skyscraper can be beautiful and livable (although affordable is actually still an issue in those places).  But not every city is a nail.

Are Skyscrapers Necessary for Density?

I just read Ed Glaeser's Atlantic piece on skyscrapers (which is excerpted from his new book on cities that I need to read).  I agree with nearly everything he says, particularly about the need for tall buildings in Mumbai, but I also think it is worth mentioning that one can get a lot of density without a lot of skyscrapers.  The municipality of Paris has a residential density of about 54,000 people per square mile; Manhattan has a residential densisity of about 71,000 people per square mile.  Paris has about 1.7 million workers, while Manhattan has about 2.1 million workers.  Yet as Ed notes, Manhattan has lots of skyscrapers, and Paris has few, and almost none outside of Le Defense.  How is this possible?

Let's look at a Google Earth image of Paris from 50,000 feet up:

Now lets's look at Manhattan from the same height:

Notice how at this scale you can see the minor streets of Manhattan pretty clearly, but not the minor streets of Paris?  Paris actually uses its land very efficiently--it does not waste space on streets or setbacks.  As a consequence, while it can be livable (if not affordable) with 3/4 of the denisity of Manhattan and a small fraction of the number of tall buildings of Manhattan.

There is no question that Ed is correct that mega-cities such as Mumbai, Cairo, Mexico City and Sao [Paulo] require skyscrapers to house people adequately and affordably.  But as he also notes, building skyscrapers is a lot more expensive than low-rise buildings.  For many cities, more efficient land-use could go a long way toward making cities more livable, more walkable, and less expensive.

Mark Zandi and Christian DiRitis on the Moral Hazard of a Hybrid Mortgage System

I think they get it right:

One potential weakness of a hybrid system involves moral hazard: If private investors believe the government will bail them out if things go badly, they will take inappropriate risks. Such concerns were illustrated by the recent experience with the two government-sponsored mortgage finance agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These institutions took on too much risk, holding too little capital for the kinds of investments they held in mortgage securities. While their private shareholders were effectively wiped out, bondholders were made whole when the federal government put Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship.

Moral hazard cannot be eliminated in a hybrid model, but it can be significantly mitigated. The system we support would require enough private capital to withstand losses associated with a 25% decline in house prices. Before the crisis, Fannie's and Freddie's capital levels were designed to withstand only a 10% decline. The hybrid system's catastrophic insurance would not kick in until losses reached levels consistent with a 25% price drop, providing significant financial incentive for private investors to make sound lending decisions. 

It is also important to recognize that moral hazard exists even in a fully privatized system. Investors in such a system are likely to assume that in extreme circumstances, the government would still step in, congressional pledges to the contrary notwithstanding. Recent experience has only reinforced this belief, as the government stepped in during the financial crisis to bail out the system. In the hybrid system plan, the government's backstop is explicit and paid for by private investors. 

Mark Thoma on Social Insurance

Mark's postings are reliably good, but today's is especially good:

...There is a need for social insurance. I had hoped this recession would show people that it can happen to anyone, that high moral character is not enough to protect you from the vagaries of the market system. One day a job can be gone, morals or not, savings can evaporate as a result, and all those years of doing the right thing -- putting a little away each month for the future -- provides little protection against financial ruin when there are no jobs to be found.




Don't get me wrong. I think it's good to make people aware of the amount of government services they consume, and that such awareness could help some in getting support for social insurance and other programs. So I'm not saying that making people aware of their own use of these services has no value. But I really do think the key to more widespread support is to make people aware of the need for social insurance, and the fact that insurance -- by it's very nature -- means that those people unlucky enough to need it will often consume more than they put in (just as would be the case under fire insurance if your house burns down), while others will consume less. That's how insurance works and we shouldn't resent those unlucky enough to need it.



The key here is to overcome the belief that the majority of people using these services are "gaming" the system to get handouts they don't deserve. If we are going to successfully defend the social insurance system, it is this belief that must be countered. Of course such behavior goes on, there will always be people who try to take advantage of any system that is put in place (in the public or private sector), but this is not the predominant feature of these programs. The share of "deadbeats" is not large, it is relatively small given all the good such programs do, and that's the message that needs to be delivered. The social benefits clearly exceed the costs of providing these services, but it will be tough to make this case convincingly -- the opposition can always find isolated cases where people take advantage of the system and surround them with negative publicity. This has been a successful strategy, and it will take a concerted effort to counter overcome such efforts.

Four quick points about Fannie-Freddie Reform

(1) Why have an explicit guarantee?  If TARP should have taught us anything, it is that there are implicit guarantees everywhere; it is better to be up-front about the fact that the government does provide backstops in times of crisis.

(2) How to price the guarantee?  Mark Zandi has a good explanation.  The hard part is going to be to keep fees up in times of low defaults.  In the early part of the last decade, Fannie and Freddie were criticized for earning excess profits on their guarantee fees, for the simple reason that defaults on prime mortgages essentially didn't exist in the 1998-2005 period.  Complaining about Fannie-Freddie's g-fees at that time would be akin to complaining the State Farm enjoys excess profits when Florida goes a year without a hurricane.

(3) In the absence of government intervention in the market, the long-term fixed-rate prepayable mortgage will likely go away.  These mortgages are expensive to households, but they also provide a level of certainty that helps households manage risk.  Households are already facing more risk than before (defined benefit pensions, anyone?), so I am not sure it is a good idea to add even more.

(4) I worry about high downpayment requirements.  It is clear that households need to put some of their own money into a house for a mortgage to be safe (gifts and grants don't count).  But while the overall homeownership rate for the US is fine, the substantial gap between whites and minorities, more than 20 percentage points, is not.  Minorities have far less wealth than whites, and across the generations, have had wealth systematically expropriated; minorities have also been discriminated against by the government in credit markets.  Massey and Denton:

In rating the home, the FHA established minimum standards for lot size, setbacks and separation from existing structures that essentially eliminated many inner-city dwellings....in the late 1940s, the FHA recommended the use of application of racially restrictive covenants...per capita mortgage spending was 6.3 times greater [in St. Louis County relative to the city of St. Louis].

I suppose in light of history, direct payments to the heirs of those who have had wealth systematically stripped away makes more sense than trying to close the homeownership gap.  But the latter seems more politically doable than the former.

SIngapore Envy

Tom Friedman rhapsodizes too much about Singapore.  While it is hardly the least free society in the world, the People's Action Party for all intents and purposes has a political monopoly.  Singapore's GINI coefficient is higher than the United States for income, as is its ratio 90th percentile to 10th percentile income.

Nevertheless, every time I pass through the city-state (I just did for the third time), I am awed by its transportation infrastructure: beautifully landscaped expressways, congestion pricing for automobiles, and well-operated bus and trail transit.  Transit is very clean, fast and efficient, and runs frequently.  The trains are often crowded but somehow not too crowded.  Changi airport is a public works project of the sort that once filled American's with pride--it is to airports what Hoover Dam is to, well, dams.  Changi is also profitable.

So when I come home to Los Angeles, I find LAX to be a little embarrassing.  When I use transit from the airport, the Flyaway Bus, I find it to be unreliable and less than spotless.  The process of buying a ticket (at the end of the journey) is cumbersome.  It would be one thing if LA were unusually bad about such things for US cities, but it is not.  The fact that New York is having a hard time getting a second rail tunnel built under the Hudson also reflects America's seeming inability to provide necessary public works.

Homeownership and Social Justice

I am reading and enjoying Simon Johnson and James Kwak's 13 Bankers. Like a lot of recent stuff (including an OECD report), it takes a swipe, if a mild one, at the virtues of homeownership.   If people think homeownershipp is overrated, I can live with that (even if I disagree with it. Where I do have a problem is when people argue that government "pushes" homeownership on people, whether they really want it or not.

I am not sure that the pushing matters that much--it is entirely possible that people, for reasons beyond financial reasons, want to own houses in particular and real estate in general.  Two things stick with me:

(1) I was talking yesterday with a developer here in India who is trying to building market-rate affordable housing.  He faces a number of hurdles, one of which, he said, is "Indians' obsession with homeownership."

(2) Years ago, when I was in Madison, the guy who cut my hair loved to talk about the rental property he owned in Florida.  It would, he said, be the source of his retirement income.  I asked him why he was so undiversified--why he didn't sell his place and put the money in an index fund.  His reply was that he didn't trust Wall Street, and that he needed an investment that he could "touch" as well as control.  I told him his mistrust of Wall Street was misplaced--shows what I knew at the time.

The point is that there is something about real estate that reduces agency problems,  One may not be able to control markets, but one can control the management of real estate that one owns.  I do remember when I left the rental market for the owner market, I was very happy, not because I thought I would make out financially (house prices in Madison had been stagnant for years), but because I disliked my landlord, and was relieved that I would no longer have to write a check to him. 

This is not to say putting people in houses they cannot afford is a good idea, and I have long been dubious of very low downpayment schemes (I do think homeowners who put no equity into their houses are not really owners).  But it is a little too easy for people who own houses (or have the choice to do so) to say it is not important to make the option available to others.  Freedom to some extent means the ability to take control of one's own life, and to avoid agency issues as much as possible. 

I freely confess that this is all supposition based on informal observation.  Some work has been done on how ownership solves some agency issues, but I think it is an understudied phenomenon.  If anyone wants to help me think about how to model such things formally, I would welcome the assistance.

According to an informal vote of Indian School of Business MBAs...

...the cities with the most potential for real estate investment in India are Pune and Ahmedabad. 

How much freedom to choose?

Ed Glaeser argues that the "moral heart of economics" is "freedom" and in particular the "freedom to choose:"

Improvements in welfare occur when there are improvements in utility, and those occur only when an individual gets an option that wasn’t previously available. We typically prove that someone’s welfare has increased when the person has an increased set of choices.

When we make that assumption (which is hotly contested by some people, especially psychologists), we essentially assume that the fundamental objective of public policy is to increase freedom of choice.

I will leave it to others to dispute the notion that more choices are always better than fewer.  But I can't help but think that it is to easy for those of us who are tenured professors to extoll the virtue of free choice, for the simple reason that we get so many, well, choices.  We get to choose what we write, we to a large extent get to choose what we teach inside our classes, and we can piss our deans off and pay fairly little in the way of consequences.  We might not get a raise or we might have to teach a class that we would rather not, but this is all small beer.  We can make an awful lot of choices and still be economically secure.

Now consider the administrative assistant at a corporation who has a boorish boss and a sick kid.   The company she (he) works for has a good health insurance plan, but if she were to leave, she would find herself unable to get coverage at a reasonable price.  Does she really have choice?

Consider the West Virginia coal miner who goes into a dangerous mine every day, and whose life expectancy is shortened with each hour worked underground.  Now consider the fact that the miner grew up in a West Virginia town with a poor school in an environment where going to college was a rare phenomenon.  Does that miner have a choice?

I could go on, but I think the point is fairly clear.  There are times when government intervention could expand the choice set up a large number of people.

Ed does point out how government can improve choice sets, and for that he deserves credit.  But the more fundamental problem is that market economies produce large institutions that have limited markets inside of them, and therefore sometimes have hierarchies that can be as inhospitable to personal liberty as government bureaucracies.  Elinor Ostrom's Nobel win in 2009 shows that the economics profession is beginning to recognize this problem,  but I am not sure Ph.D. students are broadly encouraged to study it.    

Uh-oh

I met with a large developer here in India.  He told me that "rent models," (i.e., discounted cash flow models) don;t work in India--that everyone wants to own property in India, and so India is different.  I remember a Japanese real estate guy telling me the same thing about Japan in the late 1980s.

At least there isn't a lot of leverage here, so the systemic risk of a collapse in prices is lower.  But still....

Mark Thoma passes on terrible news about Maxine Udall, girl economist

To all Maxine Udall Girl Economist Readers

I didn't know who she was, but I felt like I knew her.  She was smart and wise.

Land use regulation and the cost of housing, Indian style

Mumbai is among the densest cities in the world: as a metropolitan area, it is roughly ten times denser than New York (h/t Alain Bertaud).  Yet residential zoning codes typically have FSIs (the equivalent of a floor-area ratio) of between 1 and 1.33.  This compares with typical central business district FSIs of between 5 and 15 in other cities around the world, and there are places in Hong Kong, which is a very attractive city, where it reaches 20.  

So what happens when the most crowded large city in the world forbids intense development?  Prices get very high.  The most expensive parts of Mumbai are more expensive than Manhattan; the least expensive are comparable to the American Midwest, but people's "middle-class" incomes are perhaps 1/8 as large in Mumbai.

A developer I spoke with last night told me that if FSIs were raised to 4 (still low by world standards), prices would fall by about 50 percent.  While this is not an econometrically determined elasticity, it does make a certain amount of sense.  It would be worth at least doing the policy experiment of raising FSI uniformly.

As for services, well, there are already plenty of people using services.  The average person in Mumbai consumes about 30 square meet of residential floor space, so allowing more vertical development might, if anything, alleviate crowding, both inside and out.  

The present value relationship still doesn't work in India

I had students here in Hyderabad gather data on rents, and then we put together a valuation pro forma.  We determined that the present discounted value of flats here is roughly 40 percent of their sale price.

I have been doing this sort of exercise since I first visited south Asia seven years ago, and I get about the same outcome every time.  It is not credit that is driving this market--many people buy property with cash.  People tell stories about "black money" financing property--this is untraceable, and therefore untaxed, money.    But our calculations imply an implicit tax rate of 60 percent--taxes in India are not that high (in fact, other than an eight percent transfer tax, they are fairly similar to the US).

So the story must be about expectations, and indeed, that is the story I hear.  But current yields are well under 3 percent, and if values rise faster than rents, those yields will get even lower.  Something has got to give.  I just have no idea when.

The OECD says imputed rent should be taxed

When homeowners own their property with equity, they get a tax benefit as important as the mortgage interest deduction: the imputed rent they pay to themselves goes untaxed.  To think about how this works, consider two nieghbors who own their houses free and clear.  Suppose the houses are identical, and that the nieghbors swap houses, paying rent to each other.  They now have a tax liability that they would not have had they remained in their houses.  Avoiding this liability is tantamount to a tax expenditure--a benefit to those who own their houses without debt.  The OECD is correct that countries rarely tax imputed rent, and argues that this lack of taxation has tilted investment toward housing to the detriment of more productive uses.  It also argues that the benefits to homeownership are overstated.  I am not sure that this is true (see here and here), but I will leave that for another time.

The question is how does one go about taxing imputed rent?  It is not easy.  One could start by imposing an ad valorem tax on property values (such as a local property tax), but that doesn't tax imputed rent per se, because it does not take into account expected inflation (if one person expects her house to go up in value, and another does not, the rent the first person pays is lower than the second).  Alternatively, one could find comparables in the rental market and attribute rents found there to the owner market.  But owner and rental markets are so segmented that this would be difficult to do.

This has implications for fairness; if we don't know what we are taxing, it is hard to know how much to tax it. 

Amy Chua and the Reflection Problem

I saw Amy Chua speak some years ago (at the World Bank, I think) about her book, World on Fire. She was an excellent, witty and provocative speaker, so much so that I read the book as a result. And while the book was indeed thought-provoking, it was not convincing. Her basic point was that democracies can produce instability: minorities in democracies can amass economic wealth, which in turn leads to resentment, which in turn leads to political scapegoating and instability and all other kinds of bad things. The problem is she never presented to me a convincing counterfactual; she never showed me how a world devoid of democracy would also be devoid of resentment and instability.

As a result of reading World on Fire, I will not read Battle Hymn beyond the excerpt in the Wall Street Journal (although I understand that the excerpt is not representative of the book). If the book is only a memoir, then it is almost certainly fine, but this is not how it is being represented. Instead, it is being characterized as a comparison between "Chinese parenting" and its results and "Western parenting" and its results. Again, this may be unfair to Ms. Chua, but the book has spurred myriad commentary about the virtues and deficiencies of various parenting styles.

What is lost in all of this is how difficult it is to actually draw inferences about the effects of parenting styles on outcomes. Charles Manski calls this "the reflection problem." Here is Manski:

Here is an identification problem from everyday life: Suppose that you observe the almost simultaneous movements of a person and of his image in a mirror. Does the mirror image cause the person's movements, does the image reflect the person's movements, or do the person and image move together in response to a common external stimulus? Empirical observations alone cannot answer this question. Even if you were able to observe innumerable instances in which persons and their mirror images move together, you would not be able to logically deduce the process at work. To reach a conclusion requires that you understand something of optics and of human behavior.

A like inferential problem, which I have called the reflection problem (Manski 1993a), arises if you try to interpret the common observation that individuals belonging to the same group tend to behave similarly. Two hypotheses often advanced to explain this phenomenon are endogenous effects, wherein the propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies with the prevalence of that behavior in the group; and correlated effects, wherein individuals in the same group tend to behave similarly because they face similar environments and have similar individual characteristics.

Similar behavior within groups could stem from endogenous effects (e.g., group members could experience pressure to conform to group norms) or group similarities might reflect correlated effects (e.g., persons with similar characteristics might choose to associate with one another). Empirical observations of the behavior of individuals in groups, even innumerable such observations, cannot per se distinguish between these hypotheses. To draw conclusions requires that empirical evidence be combined with sufficiently strong maintained assumptions about the nature of individual behavior and social interactions.

Why might you care whether observed patterns of behavior are generated by endogenous effects, by correlated effects, or in some other way? A good practical reason is that different processes have differing implications for public policy. For example, understanding how students interact in classrooms is critical to the evaluation of many aspects of educational policy, from ability tracking to class size standards to racial integration programs.

Suppose that, unable to interpret observed patterns of behavior, you seek the expert advice of two social scientists. One, perhaps a sociologist, asserts that pressure to conform to group norms makes the individuals in a group tend to behave similarly. The other, perhaps an economist, asserts that persons with similar characteristics choose to associate with one another. Both assertions are consistent with the empirical evidence. The data alone cannot reveal whether one assertion or the other is correct. Perhaps both are. This is an identification problem.

Whatever one thinks about Ms. Chua's parenting, we have no firm evidence whether her kids' outcomes are a function of Chinese parenting, Chua-specific parenting, or just her kids' endemic talents. It is a serious problem when we forget that.

Some evidence about state government spending multipliers.

Three abstracts. The findings should give the pain caucus some pause.

Daniel Shoag:

The effect of government spending on income and employment is a central unresolved question in macroeconomics.

This paper employs a novel identification strategy to isolate exogenous and unexpected variation in state government spending. State governments manage large defined-benefit pension plans for which they bear the investment risk. Using a newly-collected dataset on the returns and portfolios of these plans, I show that the idiosyncratic component of their returns is a strong predictor of subsequent
state government spending. Instrumenting with this ‘windfall’ component of returns, I find that state government spending has a large positive effect on income and employment. Baseline estimates indicate that each dollar of spending raises in-state income by 2.12, and that 35,000 of spending generates one
additional job. These effects are not due to in-state investment bias, are concentrated in the non-traded sector, and are larger during times of labor force ‘slack.’ Finally, I consider how these results compare with the predictions of a standard macroeconomic model and outline which features in the model are
consistent with the empirical findings.

Nakamura and Steinsson:

We use rich historical data on military procurement spending across U.S. regions to estimate the e ffects of government spending in a monetary union. Aggregate military build-ups and draw-downs have diff erential e ffects across regions. We use this variation to estimate an open economy government spending multiplier of approximately 1.5. Standard closed economy estimates of the government spending multiplier are highly sensitive to how strongly monetary policy \leans against the wind." In contrast, our estimates "diff erence out" these eff ects because diff erent regions in a monetary union share a common monetary policy. This allows us
to better distinguish between alternative business cycle models. We show that our estimates are consistent with a New Keynesian model with GHH preferences. They are consistent with a small closed-economy multiplier when monetary policy is highly responsive (as in the Volcker- Greenspan era) and a substantially larger closed-economy multiplier when interest rates are less responsive (as at the zero lower bound).

Clemens and Miran:

Balanced budget requirements lead to substantial pro-cyclicality in state government spending outside of safety-net programs. At the beginnings of recessions, states tend to experience unexpected deficits. While all states ultimately pay these deficits down, differences in the stringency of their balanced budget requirements dictate the pace at which they adjust. States with strict rules enact large rescissions to their budgets during the years in which adverse shocks occur; states with weak rules make up the difference during the following years. We use this variation to identify the impact of mid-year budget cuts on state income and employment. Our baseline estimates imply i) a state-spending multiplier of 1.7 and ii) that avoiding $25,000 in mid-year cuts preserves one job. These cuts are associated with shifts in the timing of government expenditures rather than differences in total spending over the course of the business cycle. Consequently, our results are informative about the potential gains from smoothing the path of state government spending. They imply that states could reduce the amplitude of business-cycle fluctuations by 15% if they completely smoothed their capital spending and service provision outside of safety-net programs.

ASSA Interviewing Etiquette

Here is a suggestion for freshly-minted Ph.D.'s looking for Assistant Professor jobs: take time to at least glance at the web sites of the places to which you are applying.  Even in academia, people who are hiring you want to know that you have at least a little interest in the place where they work.

Apologies to Mark Thoma

I was sloppy in characterizing Mark's comments about Gene Sperling.  He writes:

I think this misstates what I have said. I posted something defending Sperling, and the claim that 

"their grounds are basically that he is a protege of Robert Rubin and that he took money to work (essentially) as a consultant for Goldman Sachs."

I didn't say he was a protege, and said nothing about the money, etc.

I did say that from a political view I thought the administration would be better off breaking its ties with the Clinton administration personnel, just as I said the same thing about Summers. But that is different from saying there is something wrong with Gene in particular other than the political baggage that comes with him.

Here is what I said specifically. First, I echoed a post defending him. Then, I said "I still think a break from the Wall Street connected side of the Clinton administration would have political value."

See: 

http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2010/12/who-should-replace-summers.html

Tim Duy had much more to say, but those are his words, not mine.

Goldman Sachism?

I enjoy Felix Salmon and Mark Thoma's blogs a lot.  In the last day, both have lamented the possibility that Gene Sperling might replace Larry Summers; their grounds are basically that he is a protege of Robert Rubin and that he took money to work (essentially) as a consultant for Goldman Sachs.

I suppose I should disclose that I once got to sit next to and talk with Gene Sperling on an airplane from Jackson Hole to Denver, and he struck me as a person of great intelligence and even temperament.  That doesn't particularly matter--it does matter, however, that the people who I know who know him also regard him as a person of great intelligence and even temperament.  Let me emphasize the temperament part.  He also pushed for the very good idea of imposing Pigou taxes on banks.

So far as I know, his critics do not suggest that he is really personally deficient, but that he is a problem because (1) he worked in the Clinton Administration under Robert Rubin and/or (2) he received money from Goldman Sachs.  To me, the first part is actually a recommendation, but I feel the need to comment on the second.

Goldman Sachs has done things for which it should not be proud.  Does that mean that anyone who worked at/for the place should be disqualified from government?  In its history, the Ford Motor Company has done unlovely things; Boeing has done some not-so-great things; I am not please at some of the things my one-time employer, Freddie Mac, has done.  This does not mean people who worked at Ford, Boeing and Freddie Mac should be disqualified from government.  All these places, as well as Goldman Sachs, have many intelligent, honest, capable people.

If you have a beef with the substance of Sperling, fine.  If you think Furman would be better in the job, that is fine too.  But guilt by association is just too easy, and has its own ugly history.

Top Ten Cities for Real Estate Investment (h/t Wisconsin Graaskamp Center and Francois Ortalo-Magne)

The Association of Foreign Investors in Real Estate surveyed real estate investors from around the world about places and property types.  Among other questions, they asked respondents to list cities that had the best prospects for commercial real estate.  The list:

1. New York
2. Washington
3. London
4. Paris
5. Shanghai
6. Singapore
7. Hong Kong
8. Madrid (!!!)
9. Sydney
10. Los Angeles