Joe Morello never ceases to amaze me. Listen to how he keeps the 5/4 signature alive through is complicated solo.
Monday, September 10, 2007
Friday, September 07, 2007
Why Private Equity?
AMB is an industrial REIT that has a private subsidiary whose existence is a puzzle to me. The REIT and the subsidiary share profits until the subsidiary reaches a return target, after which the public company gets the lion's share of the profit. In other words, the public and private companies split the risk, but the public company has more upside potential. This makes no sense in a Modigliani-Miller world (or any reasonable world, for that matter).
The benefit of the private company in this context is that it is not priced every day. Managers of institutional portfolios like this, because they don't have to report losses until they are realized. With stocks, managers can be measured on a minute-to-minute basis. Chris Mayer at Columbia, who knows more about this stuff than I, confirms that this can be a motivator for how fund managers choose their investments.
Wednesday, September 05, 2007
How big is the Subprime mess?
The S&L Crisis cost around $150 billion in present value terms (see http://www.erisk.com/Learning/CaseStudies/USSavingsLoanCrisis.asp). But the economy in 1995, which was pretty much when the clean-up ended, was half the size in nominal terms as it is now. So in the context of its economy, the subprime crisis is smaller than the S&L crisis, which was one of a number of events that led to a relatively mild, short-lived recession.
But there is an important difference. This crisis appears to have done serious reputational harm to rating agencies, which is turn means that lenders have less confidence about their ability to get repaid. This is turn means that non-residential lending is being affected by the subprime crisis. How much these spillovers matter will determine how much the crisis matters to the macroeconomy.
Professor John Taylor of Stanford presented a graph at Jackson Hole that suggested that the spillover from the subprime market to US credit markets was large, but that credit markets in other countries have to this point been immune from contagion. Let's hope this continues abroad, and that the non-subprime debt market in the US returns to normal reasonably soon.
Tuesday, September 04, 2007
The paper I have with Wachter at the Jackson Hole Symposium
Still needs a little cleaning up, but it is basically what we will submit for the symposium issue.
Monday, September 03, 2007
The Theme that runs through the Bourne movies
BTW, if you like action movies at all, The Bourne Ultimatum is about as good as it gets.
Sunday, September 02, 2007
An Interesting Idea from Andrew Samwick and Dean Baker
Allow those who defaulted stay in their homes at fair market rent. Only houses at less than median value would qualify. This is an interesting idea. I'll need to think it through at greater length...
House Price Indices: Case-Shiller and OFHEO
The two indices have three principal differences:
OFHEO has only houses financed with conforming mortgages (those with balances of less than $417,000). CS uses all sales.
OFHEO includes appraised values for refinance loans. CS looks only at sales.
OFHEO includes houses that may have been substantially improved from one sale to the next. CS throws those houses out.
In short, CS is better. The only advantage OFHEO has is that it covers the whole country--CS only covers the 20 largest metropolitan areas.
You know you're travelling too much when
I know people hate United, but I don't think they are any worse than any other US airline (save one), and if you fly them a lot, you get seats with more legroom. You also get to listen to Air Traffic Control, and they have the tasty tuna.
Lots of people seem to love Southwest--I am not sure why. But Jetblue is really great. They just don't go enough places yet.
Jim Hamilton writes from Jackson Hole about GSEs
Jim makes a connection between the GSEs and the current mortgage crisis.
http://www.econbrowser.com/cgi-bin/mt-tb.cgi/633
The problem is that we really need the GSEs to step in and help right now (I think Jim's comments suggests that he agrees with this), but we don't want to write a big fat check to Fannie and Freddie.
Perhaps the thing to do is embodied in a comment I wrote on a paper by the USC gang for a Brookings Volume:
"The United States has idiosyncratic institutions whose purpose is to provide capital to mortgage markets while not originating loans. Two of these institutions, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are among the largest financial intermediaries in the world, with assets of about $800 billion each.[i] Each company guarantees well over $1 trillion of off-balance-sheet mortgages.[ii]
Beyond being large, both of these companies are highly profitable, with typical book returns on equity of 25 percent.[iii] Critics of the firms argue that, on a risk-adjusted basis, they are too profitable.[iv] Specifically, they argue that shareholders whose debts are implicitly guaranteed by the U.S. government should not earn such large returns.
The size and profitability of the companies are likely the reason that they are required to meet affordable housing goals. The original charters of the companies were silent on the issue of affordability. Rather, they emphasized stability, liquidity, and ubiquity.[v] It was not until 1992, with passage of the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act, that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac faced a regulatory requirement to target mortgage funding to “low- and moderate-income” borrowers, to “underserved” census tracts, and to “very low-income” borrowers or low-income borrowers in “low-income” areas. It is not a stretch to think that Congress felt that, in light of the companies’ special status and profitability, they had a special obligation to help those at the margins of the housing market. These targets became known as the “affordable housing goals.”
The paper by An, Bostic, Deng, and Gabriel asks a very simple question: Did the regulatory requirements put in place in 1992 work...
...[An, Bostic, Deng, and Gabriel’s] results taken as a whole imply that the affordable housing goals have accomplished little in terms of directing mortgage capital to the “underserved.” One could look at the goals as a classic outcome predicted by the public choice literature, which argues that government attempts to cure distortions that it created itself with other distortions.[i] In this particular case, regulators are trying to “cure” a distortion that arises from the existence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: an unnaturally high return on equity to the shareholders of these two companies. This distortion arises from the perceived backing that the two companies receive from the federal government.[ii]
The purpose of the goals is to tax the companies and send shareholder benefits to underserved borrowers and neighborhoods. Structured as they are, however, the goals may simply shift profits from Fannie and Freddie shareholders to mortgage originators. An unusually explicit example of this happened in 2003, when Freddie Mac paid Washington Mutual $6 billion to “borrow” mortgages for goal-counting purposes.[iii] This transaction did nothing to add liquidity to the mortgage market anywhere and yet was a perfectly rational reaction by both parties to the goals.
The problem with the goals is that they do not tackle the distortion created by the existence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in a head-on manner. The companies earn large profits because they are allowed to borrow at low risk-adjusted interest rates. Moody’s, for example, notes that it gives Freddie Mac an Aaa rating in part because of “dependence between Freddie Mac and the U.S. government.”[iv] In fact, Moody’s states that the default risk of Freddie Mac’s portfolio is at the level of an Aa1-rated financial institution. This is an excellent credit rating and reflects well on the management of the company, but it is still lower than Aaa: the company thus borrows at a lower rate than its credit characteristics warrant.
Congress could tackle this problem directly in one of two ways. It could raise the capital requirements for both companies, or it could follow the suggestion of Glaeser and Jaffee or Jaffee and Quigley and tax Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s issuance of new debt.[v] The second solution is particularly appealing, because it preserves the ability of Fannie and Freddie to guarantee mortgages—something that has been good for mortgage consumers in the United States—while reducing, if not completely eliminating, the ability of the companies to arbitrage their favorable borrowing position. The money raised via a debt tax could, in turn, be funneled into the Section 8 rental voucher program and, as such, could directly assist those facing the greatest housing needs.
To make this concrete, consider the impact of a 20-basis-point fee on the issuance of new debt. If the companies have at any one time $1.5 trillion in debt outstanding and turn debt over every three years, such a fee would produce $1 billion in revenue each year. This would allow for a $2,000 housing subsidy for 500,000 low-income renter families. Compared to what is currently in place, this is surely a more effective and efficient policy.
[i]. Neither Fannie Mae nor Freddie Mac has issued current financial statements. According to their most recent restated financial statements, each of the companies has more than $800 billion in assets on its balance sheet. For Freddie Mac’s consolidated financial statement for 2006, see freddiemac.com/investors/ar/ [March 2007]. For Fannie Mae’s 2003 consolidated financial statement, see www.fanniemae.com/ir/annualreport/index.jhtml?s=Annual+Reports+%26+Proxy+Statements [March 2007]. [ii]. For Freddie Mac, see freddiemac.com/investors/volsum/pdf/0107mvs.pdf [March 2008]. For Fannie Mae, see www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdf/monthly/2007/013107.pdf [March 2007].[iii]. The current five-year average return on equity is 24.1 percent for Freddie Mac and 28.9 percent for Fannie Mae. For Freddie Mac, see finapps.forbes.com/finapps/jsp/finance/compinfo/Ratios.jsp?tkr=FRE [March 2007]. For Fannie Mae, see finapps.forbes.com/finapps/jsp/finance/compinfo/Ratios.jsp?tkr=FNM [March 2007].[iv]. See, for example, Frame and White (2005).[v]. For the text of Freddie Mac’s original 1970 charter, see www.freddiemac.com/governance/pdf/charter.pdf [March 2007]. For the text of Fannie Mae’s original charter, see www.fanniemae.com/global/pdf/aboutfm/understanding/charter.pdf [March 2007].
[i]. See Tullock (1965) for the classic argument.
[ii]. I have argued that, on balance, this backing has been a good thing, because it creates liquidity in the market for conventional conforming mortgages. See Green (2005).
[iii]. See Berenson (2004a).
[iv]. Moody’s Investor Services (2006).
[v]. Glaeser and Jaffee (2006) and the paper by Jaffe and Quigley in this volume.
Tuesday, August 28, 2007
Off to Jackson Hole on Thursday
Preliminary Syllabus for Finance 397
Finance 397
Applied Microeconomic for Business
Professor Richard K. Green
Office: 507 Funger
Keynesian.richard@gmail.com
202-994-2377
202-994-9141
301-467-3582
Office Hours: 1-3 Tuesday or by Appointment
This is a course in the application of microeconomic theory to academic business disciplines. As such, it is not a traditional graduate microeconomics course, such as Economics 301. All business disciplines—even management and marketing—contain some economic theory in their literatures. For example, papers in marketing are often applications of industrial organization theory, and papers in management often deal with principal-agency and asymmetric information issues.
The class will contain four requirements: two exams (25 percent each), an 8-10 page critical review paper (30 percent), and a 15 minute presentation, such as one would give at an academic meeting (20 percent).
Texts: (*)-ed readings are required.
1. Introduction to Economic Analysis, by R. Preston McAfee, (an open source principles text downloadable from http://www.introecon.com/). (*)
2. Game Theory for Applied Economists, by Robert Gibbons, Princeton University Press (1992, paperback). ISBN 0-691-00395-5. (*)
3. Identification Problems in the Social Sciences, by Charles F. Manski, Harvard University Press, (1995, paperback). ISBN 0-674-44284-9.(*)
4.
Week 1: Introduction to Optimization and the Robinson Crusoe Economy
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ500/hallam/documents/Opt_Simple_Multi_000.pdf
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ500/hallam/documents/opt_con_gen_000.pdf
http://www.econ.ucla.edu/doepke/teaching/resources/e102ch1.pdf
Week 2: Optimization and Theory of the Firm
McAfee Chapter 4 and 6
Griliches, Zvi and Jacques Mairesse (1995) Production Functions: The Search for
Identication, NBER Working Paper No.w5067.
Week 3: Industrial Organization I
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ501/Hallam/documents/Competition_000.pdf
Borenstein, Severin, Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in
the
Week 4: Theory of the Consumer
McAfee Chapter 5
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ501/Hallam/documents/FunctionalForms.pdf
Laurits R. Christensen; Dale W. Jorgenson; Lawrence J. Lau, Transcendental Logarithmic Utility Functions, The American Economic Review, Vol. 65, No. 3. (Jun., 1975), pp. 367-383
Week 5 Industrial Organization II
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ501/Hallam/documents/Oligopoply.pdf
.
Zettelmeyer, Florian, Fiona Scott Morton, and Jorge Silva-Risso (2005) Cowboys
or Cowards: Why are Internet Car Prices Lower?
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3. (Aug., 1970), pp. 488-500
Week 6 Topics in Game Theory I
Gibbons Chapter 1
McAfee Chapter 7
Week 7 Exam I
Week 8 Topics in Game Theory II
Gibbons Chapter 2
Shapley, L. S. and M. Shubik (1972) The Assignment Game I: The Core, Interna-
tional Journal of Game Theory, 1: 111-130.
Week 9 Adverse Selection
Gibbons Chapters 3 and 4.
Week 10 Moral Hazard
Week 11 Identification I
Manski 1,2
James J. Heckman (2000) Causal Parameters and Policy Analysis In Economics:
A Twentieth Century Retrospective, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1),
45-97.
Week 12 Identification II
Manski 3-7
Week 13 Student Presentations of Applied Microeconomic Papers (choose from list)
Week 14 Exam II
Papers to choose from for presentation
Avery, Christopher, Mark Glickman, Caroline Hoxby and Andrew Metrick, A Revealed Preference Ranking of US Colleges and Universities, Working Paper.
Borenstein, Severin and Andrea Shepard (1996) Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline
Markets, Rand Journal of Economics, 27(Autumn): 429-51.
Donohue, J.J. and Steven Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, 116(2), pp. 379-420.
Gandal, Neil, M. Kende and Rafael Rob (2000) The Dynamics of Technological
Adoption in Hardware/Software Systems: The Case of Compact Disk Players, Rand
Journal of Economics, 31(1): 43-61.
Graddy, K. (1995) Testing for Imperfect Competition at the
Rand Journal of Economics, 26 (Spring): 75-92.
Green RK and MJ White, Measuring the Benefits of Homeowning: Effects on Children, Journal of Urban Economics,
Krugman, Paul, Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade
The American Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 5. (Dec., 1980), pp. 950-959.
Mankiw, G and D Weil, The Baby Boom, the Baby Bust and the Housing Market, Regional Science and Urban Economics
Monday, August 27, 2007
If you want to be scared about subprime...
http://bigpicture.typepad.com/comments/2007/08/cdo-insiders-we.html
The story I heard from a bond trader is that the Chinese were willing to buy paper at very low spreads just to keep the RMB from appreciating. I have no idea whether this is really true, but it makes for a good story.
Sunday, August 26, 2007
Subprime--I was probably wrong
The problem is that borrowers did not understand what the sales people where selling them. Loans are complicated--even the "sticker price," the APR, doesn't really tell the story. And so borrowers, particularly those without any financial training, are at a disticnt disadvantage when dealing with lenders.
I am not sure what to do about this. I have long thought that the sub-prime market could give borrowers access to cheaper credit than they would get elsewhere; nevertheless, the market also led people to make what were clearly bad decisions. I am not sure how reasonable it was to expect borrowers to understand how bad their decisions would turn out to be.
And so we must figure out a mechanism for helping borrowers navigate the mortgage waters better. I am not sure what that is. One possibility: tie loan broker compensation not just to loan origination, but loan performance. They don't get fully paid until the loan is fully paid. This would reduce the incentive for them to make loans that will turn into defaults.
Teaching and Research Again
Wednesday, August 22, 2007
Dhaka's getting worse
When I visited Dhaka in 2004, it was a place of unspeakable poverty, and according to Transparency International, had among the world's worst corruption. But so far as I could tell, people could move, speak and organize reasonably freely. The press was certainly vigorous and regularly criticized the government. It was hardly a paragon of human rights. To me, human rights include the right to have enough to eat and the right of all children to go to school. But among all the world's poor countries, its human rights record was not too bad.
Still, I left Dhaka thinking that life would get better there. It has actually shown itself capable of competing in the textile business in the absence of the multifibre agreement. The people there were also remarkably gracious. I thought there was a chance for corruption to be reduced, and for the middle-class to grow. I hope that I will someday be proved correct, but today I don't have a lot of hope.
Monday, August 20, 2007
How does the NFL get away with charging for the Preseason?
As it happens, a student of mine, Jason Berkowitz, did some regressions of how well the preseason predicted the real season. The answer is that it doesn't--a team's winning percentage in the preseason has almost no predictive power of regular season fortunes.
So the question is--why do fans pay full ticket prices to see these fake games? It is not like spring training in baseball, when going to games in in part an excuse to get away from the cold north. I know this is not the most important issue facing the NFL today, but after watching that game, I just had to wonder....
Tuesday, August 14, 2007
Sub-prime returns.
Five year life (stiff prepayment penalties before year five), after which everyone who survives refinances.
Coupon rate starts at 6 for two years, goes to 9 for a year and then 12 for two years.
10 percent default rate over five years with 70 percent loss severity.
Mortgage is tranched into two pieces. Piece A gets the first 80 percent of the equity and a six percent coupon; Piece B gets all the rest.
The IRR on this set up fro the B-piece comes in around 9 percent. Not great, given the risk, but not bad either. It should be enough to pay any leverage taken on to buy it. So...where am I going wrong? I will be happy to share the spreadsheet with anyone who can help me out.
Monday, August 13, 2007
The Jumbo Market and House Prices
But the impact on prices could be serious. Consider what happens when the cost of capital increases quickly by 50 basis points, from 6.5 to 7 percent. The cost of capital has gone up 7.7 percent. But lets say that expectations are for 2 percent house value growth. Then the cap rate for houses goes from 4.5 percent to 5 percent--an 11.1 percent increase. This translates into a ten percent decline in house prices (CF/5)/(CF/4.5) =4.5/5 = .9.
But this phenomenon could change expectations about futue house price expectations. As expectations worsen, the cap rate will rise further, and house prices will fall further. The next few months might be pretty ugly for the coasts.
Wednesday, August 01, 2007
Can Las Vegas Keep Building Apartments?
The answer is: a lot. The basic industry is, of course, accomodation. Las Vegas has around 140,000 hotel rooms (http://cber.unlv.edu/stats.html) with an cccupany rate in excess of 90 percent. Hotels are profitable at occupancy rates of around 65 percent, meaning that Las Vegas could support something like 50,000 more hotel rooms with no increase in demand.
Let's cut that to 25,000 rooms to be conservative. There are roughly two jobs in the hotel business for every room in Las Vegas, meaning that 25,000 rooms will directly create about 50,000 jobs.
Economic base analysis (http://faculty.washington.edu/krumme/350/econbase.html) for Las Vegas predicts that every basic job produces an additional 2.5 non-basic jobs. So the Las Vegas market has room for another 175,000 jobs over the near-to-medium term (say 5 years).
The ratio of jobs to population in Las Vegas is .47; let's round and say population growth produced by hotel room growth will be 350,000. The average Household Size is a little more than 2.5 (census) and about 35 percent of households live in multifamily buildings (again, census). Put this all together, and there will be demand for about 50,000 multi-family units over the medium term--again assuming no growth in demand for hotel rooms. Vacancy rates for apartments in Las Vegas is a little less than 7 percent--this is close to a natural vacancy rate, meaning that the market is currently in equilibrium. The fact that inflation adjusted rents have risen by a bit more than inflation in the past year also indicates that the apartment market is not oversupplied. Assuming hotel developers respond to demand, there should be strong demand for apartments for some years to come.
There are issues, of course, not the least of which is water (although if people would stop watering their lawns, there would be plenty of water for awhile). But it is remarkable how much Las Vegas' strong population growth (and therefore demand for housing construction) is grounded in fundamentals.