Saturday, March 07, 2009

Fun with Charting Tax Rates and Growth

Just for fun, I plotted the top marginal federal tax rate from 1947 through 2006 against real GDP growth for each year. Here is what I get:



GDP data come from BEA; Federal Tax Data from Brookings and the Urban Institute. The correlation is actually slightly positive (about .098). I am not suggesting that higher marginal tax rates cause economic growth. But it is awfully hard for me to see where a ten percent increase in marginal tax rates for the wealthiest among us will bring about economic ruin.

Friday, March 06, 2009

What is his evidence?

Michael Boskin writes in today's Wall Street Journal:

Increasing the top tax rates on earnings to 39.6% and on capital gains and dividends to 20% will reduce incentives for our most productive citizens and small businesses to work, save and invest -- with effective rates higher still because of restrictions on itemized deductions and raising the Social Security cap. As every economics student learns, high marginal rates distort economic decisions, the damage from which rises with the square of the rates (doubling the rates quadruples the harm). The president claims he is only hitting 2% of the population, but many more will at some point be in these brackets.


I know Boskin is one of my betters, but I am having hard time with this statement. These were the tax rates during the Clinton years, and people seemed to work awfully hard then. I also wonder if it is necessarily the case that our highest paid citizens are in fact our most productive. Given what we now know about the decisions taken by investment bankers, does Boskin really want to argue a strong correlation between productivity and very high pay?

[Update. David Barker in the comments paper points me to an Ed Prescott paper arguing that taxes affect the labor supply. He uses a cross country comparison to do so. But so far as I can tell, his results derive from a simulation model with some assumed parameters about the size of the capital stock across countries and the value of leisure. There are no controls for the relative size of the social safetuy net by country. I can't find a standard error in the paper, so it is hard to know what the results really mean. I certainty don't see firm evidence supporting Boskin's quadratic rule.]

Wednesday, March 04, 2009

Why not just reduce the principal?

Details of the Obama plane to help mortgage borrowers were released this morning. The order in which the mods will happen: interest rate reduction, term extension, principal reduction.

This is backward. Suppose a $100,000 loan has a 7 percent coupon, and its rate is modified down to 4 percent. The payment drops from $665 per month to $477 per month. This helps, but leaves the borrower underwater, making it difficult for her to sell if she needs to move to a new job.

But a $477 payment, at 7 percent annual interest, has a present value of $71,759. So if the interest rate remained the same and the loan balance was written down by 28 percent, the payment would be the same as an interest rate write-down to 4 percent, but the borrower would have her head above water. If she later sells for more than $72K + selling costs, she can split the proceeds with the lender, who would now basically be a shared equity owner.

I think the people in the Obama Administration are very smart. Why aren't they doing this?

Tuesday, March 03, 2009

The Amtrak Problem

Passenger rail subsidies make sense in small parts of the United States: Washington to Boston for sure, and perhaps Southeastern Florida, Chicago to Detroit, and LA to San Diego (sorry for being provincial).

Yet Amtrak continues to run far-flung rail lines that make no sense economically. The losses from these lines undermine Amtrak's ability to take on the projects it really needs--like a new tunnel through Baltimore.

Why does it do it? It's web site gives the answer: it runs through 255 Congressional Districts. Amtrak must always run through at least 218 Congressional Districts, whether it makes any sense or not.

Such is the fundemental problem with nationally owned companies.

Monday, March 02, 2009

Nostalgia

NPR's Susan Stamberg had a nice piece this morning on typewriters.

In my first job after graduating from college, I worked for the Department of Energy. We GS-7s were not supposed to type for ourselves--secretaries were supposed to do that. But my handwriting is illegible, and my job required me to write a lot (something like two 10-20 page Decision and Orders a week), so to keep our secretaries from going mad, I needed to be able to type first drafts.

In a supply closet, I found an IBM selectric that nobody else seemed to be using, so I accidentally placed it on my desk. No one said anything, so it stayed there for the remainder of my time at DOE. I loved that thing--before or since, I have never encountered anything on which I could type as quickly or accurately.

Last Dust-up Point Counterpoint

First Chris Thornberg--then me.


Point: Christopher Thornberg

The homeowner rescue plans so far have been failures. Either few troubled borrowers have signed up or, more significantly, within just a few months of having their loans modified a shockingly large portion of the borrowers are back in default. The entire rescue process has accomplished little more than increasing the cost to the banks by extending the foreclosure process that much longer.

There are two possible explanations for this re-default problem. One is that the programs simply don't acknowledge that with loans sharply underwater, folks have little incentive to maintain their mortgages even when payments are being lowered to something more affordable.

It has been claimed that past studies have shown that being underwater is a necessary but not sufficient condition for foreclosure. I would argue that we have never had a housing downturn as dramatic as this one, with people so desperately underwater, and we have never had so many families with such small stakes in the game (witness no-money-down mortgages with initially negative amortization payment levels). As such, past data points offer little in terms of comparison to the current situation. From this perspective, borrowers go along with the mortgage modification plans simply to maintain their housing situation for a few extra months.

The second potential explanation is that these mortgage programs do not screen their applicants for other potential issues, such as the loss of income due to the downturn, debt burdens outside the mortgage or perhaps even verifying income to see if the new "affordable" payment is in fact affordable. As we now know, even with mortgages where incomes were supposedly verified, brokers quickly learned how to game the system in such a way as to not trigger further verification efforts. In other words, many of those prime loans were not.

President Obama's plan is another one-size-fits-all scheme without much effort to distinguish between those who have a reasonable chance of having a workout succeed and those for whom the workout represents little more than a few extra months of free rent. It relies on one streamlined effort to reduce payments with little effort made to try to distinguish those who might be helped from those for whom help is useless.

Is there a better way? Should we study these mortgages on a case-by-case basis? Perhaps -- but the industry has little incentive to make the investments to deal with such complexities. Remember that during the bubble, a mortgage company earned 2% or 3% of the value of the loan for closing a mortgage. This amounts to $5,000 to $10,000 per mortgage in higher-priced markets with little cost to the broker, given all the rapid computerized systems being used to place the money. With this revenue flow gone, the industry has rapidly shrunk. Now the administration is offering a paltry $1,500 per mortgage to servicing companies that try to work things out. This time, however, the cost to mortgage companies will likely be much higher because more individual verification is needed. This simply isn't realistic.

The other option is to have the government pony up even more cash to facilitate the process, with the intent of simply shrinking the potential pool of applicants. And of course we will still have the legal and ethical minefield to negotiate as we work to rescue people from their own really bad financial decisions.

If this sounds like a hopeless situation, you know what? It is! And it is about time we have an honest and open discussion that acknowledges the hopelessness and stops using expensive knee-jerk policies in place of rational approaches. As a nation, we need to allow this process to take place naturally.

Do we need to worry about empty homes and depressed neighborhoods? Sure. But this process is much easier on the back end than the front. How about a national tax break for buying not just any home, but only a foreclosed property? How about generating a new group of potential buyers by simply not allowing current defaults to be recorded on people's credit reports? How about streamlining the foreclosure process, making it quicker and easier for banks to clear properties and find a new buyers, thus reducing their losses?

And most important, we need to think ahead to the changes that need to be made so that we never end up with such a mess again.

Christopher Thornberg is a founding partner with Beacon Economics.


Government inaction would only prolong the pain
Counterpoint: Richard K. Green

I disagree with you on a number of points, Chris.

First, we do have precedent for what is happening now: the Great Depression. While data from that time aren't as good as we would like, we do know that during the early 1930s, home prices fell at a rate similar to today and unemployment was considerably higher. Housing construction declined by 90% from peak to trough (if January's construction number is representative for the year to come, we are at about an 80% peak-to-trough decline now). Despite this, the federal government at the time developed a mortgage modification program that worked rather well, about which I will say more soon.

Second, I continue to think some of the older models of mortgage default are informative. University of Michigan economist Robert Van Order and National University of Singapore economist Yongheng Deng (among others) calibrated sophisticated models of default that looked at markets (such as Texas in the 1980s and California in the early 1990s) that went through substantial price declines. Although I agree that the new world in which we live means we should be modest about how much we actually know, it doesn't mean we should ignore the work that has been done before. The idea that families will not default if they have an equity stake in their house remains compelling to me.

Third, for the government to largely stand back and let nature take its course is, in my view, a really bad idea. Prices have fallen enough in many places that the cash-flow cost of owning now looks very favorable relative to renting -- at least by historical standards. Yet existing and new home sales in January were abysmal. Why? People lack confidence in the future. The Reuters-University of Michigan consumer confidence index is near a 28-year low. Even people who once considered themselves to be recession-proof fear they will be laid off. Under such circumstances, I am not sure we can expect people to run and buy homes whose occupants are in default.

I have long been an admirer of John Maynard Keynes, who talked about the importance of animal spirits to economic health. I do not see Americans' animal spirits recovering until house prices stop dropping. Prices will not stop declining until inventories stop rising. While home builders are doing their part (they have stopped building), allowing many more foreclosures to occur will not help this process.

During the Great Depression, the Roosevelt White House rolled out the Federal Housing Administration to insure mortgages and the Home Owners' Loan Corp. to buy defaulted mortgages. The HOLC bought the mortgages from lenders at prices below the value of the houses that were collateralizing the mortgages. It then modified payments, changing interest-only mortgages with balloon payments into 20-year self-amortizing mortgages. The HOLC worked: It bought mortgages from only 1933 to 1936, but it bought a large number during these years. It put itself out of business when the last mortgage it bought was retired in 1951. The program reduced the default rate on these mortgages by 90%. Because the government could borrow so cheaply, the HOLC actually turned a small profit for taxpayers.

To me, the HOLC (perhaps modified to include a claw-back provision) is the model for going forward.

Redistribution is happening

According to the 2004 SCF, those in the top tenth percentile of the income distribution had about 50 percent of their financial assets in equities (inlcuding mutual funds and retirement funds). Equity values are now down around 50 percent. So...

Wednesday, February 25, 2009

In the LA Times Dust-up this week

A discussion with Christopher Thornberg

More on the relative tax breaks for owning and renting

Anonymous comments:

What's missing from this argument is that the lander is taxed on the rental income (after the deductions mentioned) but the homeowner is not taxed on the imputed rental income from the home.

The real tax break that homeowners get is not the interest deduction, but the fact that the imputed rental income (what the home would rent for) is not taxed.


This is because I did not write clearly, not because I hadn't considered it. Bill Wheaton's point was that the deduction for depreciation for rental units (about 3.3 percent per year) offsets the non-taxation of imputed rent. Most owners who get lots of net income from imputed rent are the elderly, who have paid off their mortgages. Because they generally have low cash incomes, they are in low tax brackets, which means that the value of the tax benefit are small. Owners of rental units are often in higher tax brackets, which means the value of the depreciation deduction might be high.

How it all washes out is an empirical question, of course...

Sunday, February 22, 2009

Principal Reduction or Interest Reduction?

A concern raised with the Obama housing plan is it focuses on payment reduction instead of principal reduction. But a payment reduction based on a cut in interest rates has a de facto impact on principal. While par remains the same, the present value of the remaining payments falls. For anyone who doesn't need to move, this has the effect of reducing the amount owed (the mortgage) relative to the amount owned (the house).

As for those who do have to move, they are still stuck with the par value of the mortgage. On the other hand, a lower interest rate allows for more rapid amortization. An 8 percent 30-year mortgage with a 100,000 balance amortizes by about $835 in its first year, while a 5 percent mortgage amortizes by $1475. Not a huge difference, but every little bit helps.

Saturday, February 21, 2009

Are Owner and Renter Housing treated equally under the federal tax code?

UC-Irvine, The MacArthur Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation sponsored a conference this week on "Housing after the Fall."

The conference featured a number of interesting papers, but one of the most interesting conversations happened in the aftermath of Marge Turner and Denise DiPasquaule's talks on rental housing. They both pleaded for equal treatment of owner and renter housing (as did Stuart Gabriel the day before). But Bill Wheaton and John Weicher made provokative and possibly correct arguments about why the two house tenure are basically treated equally.

The biggest benefit of owner relative to renter housing is that imputed rent is not taxed. But as John points out, those who own their homes with equity are largely the elderly, many of whom have low cash incomes, which means that they have low marginal tax rates a so get small after tax benefits from owning. Both owners and landlords get to deduct interest and property taxes (although owners who pay the AMT cannot deduct property taxes). Landlords can deduct depreciation and maintenance; owners cannot. Landlords are probably in higher tax brackets than renters. Owners are (largely) exempt from capital gains taxes, but so are landlords, who can use like-kind exchanges to defer capital gains taxes forever.

Bill said he did a back of the envelope calculation that shows that the tax code treats the two tenure types about the same. The topic merits further research, but it may mean that those who think owner housing gets treated preferably may be wrong.

Wednesday, February 18, 2009

Brad Delong (and I) on Robert Barro

Evidence, Logic, and Robert Barro

Hoisted from Comments: Richard Green writes:

Grasping Reality with Both Hands: Council on Foreign Relations Wingnut Watch: Benn Steil: I am glad that Barro's logic escaped you, as well. As I am not a macroeconomist, I figured that it was I who was dense. But it seemed to me that the facts presented in the article showed that even an enormous stimulus that burned a lot of resources (building tanks and ships that will be destroyed are kind of like bridges to nowhere, economically) had very little crowding out effect.

The context is Benn Steil's claim that Robert Barro's January 22, 2009 Wall Street Journal op-ed "provides logic and offers evidence" to support Steil's claim that the interest elasticity of money demand is zero and thus that the fiscal multiplier is zero too.

As I said before, the evidence that Barro presents suggests a multiplier for temporary government purchases not of Steil's zero but instead of 0.8:

Robert J. Barro: Government Spending Is No Free Lunch: Because it is not easy to separate movements in government purchases from overall business fluctuations, the best evidence comes from large changes in military purchases that are driven by shifts in war and peace. A particularly good experiment is the massive expansion of U.S. defense expenditures during World War II.... I have estimated that World War II raised U.S. defense expenditures by $540 billion (1996 dollars) per year at the peak in 1943-44, amounting to 44% of real GDP. I also estimated that the war raised real GDP by $430 billion per year in 1943-44. Thus, the multiplier was 0.8 (430/540).... We can consider similarly three other U.S. wartime experiences -- World War I, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.... Combining the evidence with that of World War II (which gets a lot of the weight because the added government spending is so large in that case) yields an overall estimate of the multiplier of 0.8 -- the same value as before...

But it is the logic that most puzzles me. Barro writes:

The [Keynesian] theory... assumes that the government is better than the private market at marshaling idle resources.... Unemployed labor and capital can be utilized at essentially zero social cost, but the private market is somehow unable to figure any of this out. In other words, there is something wrong with the price system. John Maynard Keynes thought that the problem lay with wages and prices that were stuck at excessive levels. But this problem could be readily fixed by expansionary monetary policy, enough of which will mean that wages and prices do not have to fall. So, something deeper must be involved -- but economists have not come up with explanations, such as incomplete information, for multipliers above one...

If I read this paragraph correctly, Barro thinks (a) there are theoretical reasons to think that the fiscal multiplier cannot be greater than one, and (b) there are theoretical reasons for thinking that if you believe in positive fiscal multipliers you should also believe that expansionary monetary policy that raises the flow of nominal spending will also raise employment and production--which people do, for it is only when they fear that monetary policy is tapped out and cannot raise the flow of nominal spending any more that they fear that monetary policy may be ineffective.

So I don't understand how Barro gets to his very next sentence:

A much more plausible starting point is a multiplier of zero...

A good plan, except...

I just watched the President outline his mortgage plan. I think it has two of the three key elements necessary: it will get people's loan balance below the value of their houses, and it will reduce payments to a sustainable level. What is missing (or at least I think it is missing), is a clawback provision for those homeowners who get a subsidized loan and then profit on sale later. I think this is critical for fairness. But perhaps I have just not digested the details of the plan yet.

It was so refreshing to see a President explain things so well, though...

Monday, February 16, 2009

Gary Kamiya says the Newspaper Business Model won't work anymore

I have said something like this too, but I think he says it better:

But the real problem isn't that newspapers may be doomed. I would be severely disheartened if I was forced to abandon my morning ritual of sitting on my deck with a coffee and the papers, but I would no doubt get used to burning out my retinas over the screen an hour earlier than usual. As Nation columnist Eric Alterman recently argued, the real problem isn't the impending death of newspapers, but the impending death of news -- at least news as we know it.

....

If newspapers die, so does reporting. That's because the majority of reporting originates at newspapers. Online journalism is essentially parasitic. Like most TV news, it derives or follows up on stories that first appeared in print. Former Los Angeles Times editor John Carroll has estimated that 80 percent of all online news originates in print. As a longtime editor of an online journal who has taken part in hundreds of editorial meetings in which story ideas are generated from pieces that appeared in print, that figure strikes me as low.

There's no reason to believe this is going to change. Currently there is no business model that makes online reporting financially viable. From a business perspective, reporting is a loser. There are good financial reasons why the biggest content-driven Web business success story of the last few years, the Huffington Post, does very little original reporting. Reported pieces take a lot of time, cost a lot of money, require specialized skills and don't usually generate as much traffic as an Op-Ed screed, preferably by a celebrity. It takes a facile writer an hour to write an 800-word rant. Very seldom can the best daily reporters and editors produce copy that fast.


I have one little suggestion for those who want papers to survive. When you are on their website, if you see an ad for anything that remotely interests you, click on it. It is not much, and almost certainly not enough, but it at least will show advertisers that you are reading the site.

Fannie and Freddie must be making large profits on their new business

According to Ken Harney, even if borrowers have a 20 percent down payment, if their FICO score is less than 740, they will pay hefty fees to obtain a Fannie Freddie mortgage. Given how far prices have already fallen, and given that borrowers are required to have a lot of their own money at risk, it is hard to see how the GSEs will lose on these loans, while at the same time they will collect a lot of money in fees.

Of course, they have lots of losses to make up for, so new borrowers are being charged for the mistakes of old management. But this seems neither forward looking nor productive to me.

It should have been Lincoln Institute of Land Policy

And I should have known better...

Sunday, February 15, 2009

The Trouble with Washington

I was back at GW the last few days for a conference the George Washington Institute for Public Policy put on with the Lincoln Institute for Land Policy on Local Government Autonomy in the United States.

Overall, it was a great event. I was priveleged to discuss a Bill Fischel paper (Bill knows more about property taxes than just about anyone), and the quality of the discussion was excellent. But when people asked me whether I missed Washington, I had to say "no," but I couldn't quite put my finger on why. Washington is a beautiful city, with wonderful cultural amenities. It is diverse, it has many people there I like very much (and whom I do miss), and I got to read while riding Metro to work in the morning, afther which I would have a pleasant walk from Dupont Circle to Foggy Bottom.

I then came across the following quotes on mydd (h/t to atrios) this morning:

"It's eerie -- I read the news from the Beltway, and there's this disconnect with the polls from the Midwest that I see all around me," said Ann Seltzer, the authoritative Iowa pollster who works throughout the Midwest.

[...]

"I don't think he's lost anything in terms of overall job approval or favorability," said Andy Smith, a pollster at the University of New Hampshire. "That's just the a perception inside the Beltway that everybody outside Washington pays attention to politics and eats and lives politics the way you guys do down there."


I think these quites sum up the trouble with Washington quite well. It is a city full of self-important naval gazers. The biggest difference between DC and LA is that the first question you get asked in DC is "what's your title," while the first question you get asked in LA (outside of Hollywood, anyway) is "how bad was the traffic on your drive here?"




http://mydd.com/story/2009/2/14/1597/39888

Sunday, February 08, 2009

Airports are Infrastructure too

Patrick Smith writes in Salon:

"Americans haven't figured out how to build a proper terminal. We fail at aesthetics, we fail at amenities, and we fail at the relatively simple task of moving people efficiently from A to B. The newest terminals across Europe and Asia are attractive, spacious, quiet and efficient, abounding with passenger-friendly touches. Ours, by comparison, often seem engineered for inconvenience and stress. In Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Hong Kong and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, passengers step from commuter trains directly into the check-in hall. At Kennedy, getting to or from Manhattan, or just getting from one (brand-new) terminal to another, is like mounting an expedition."

Airports and the air traffic control system are important to economic growth. And yet among the discussions of the stimulus and infrastructure spending, I have heard little about the air traffic control system (or for that matter, the freight rail system and the water ports, all of which have insufficient capacity--and all of which should have higher priority than passenger rail, aside from the Northeast Corridor and perhaps the Great Lakes and Southern California).

Two of our most important international airports, LAX and JFK, are embarrassing. SFO's runway configuration slows traffic dramatically in the face of mild degradations in weather. Atlanta and Dallas are just unpleasant. We have a few good large airports (MSP, IAH and the new DTW come to mind), but most of them are far behind their counterparts in Europe and Asia. The best I can say for us is the French and (remarkably) the Japanese can be just as bad as we are: Charles De Gaulle and Narita are also astonishingly unpleasant.

Friday, February 06, 2009

Would 4 percent mortgages get capitalized into house prices?

I don't know--and neither does anyone else.

I am in the middle of a project with Chris Redfearn and Stuart Gabriel that looks precisely at this issue. Our finding is that capitalization varies a lot by time and place. The coasts are different from the middle of the country; the period before 1997 is different from the period after. When we do rolling regressions across time to attempt to identify capitalization effects, we get very unstable coefficients.

This is not to say borrower relief is a bad idea--I have come around to the view that we need to do it (although I would like to see clawbacks). But let's not kid ourselves--we have no good model to predict the effectiveness of any policy right now.

Sunday, February 01, 2009

Ads I can live without

So I am watching one of the best Super Bowl 4th quarters ever, and this ad comes on with an obnoxious baby advising us to stop being passive about our 401(k)s and (basically) to try to pick individual stocks on our own. Does the company that made this ad really think this can work?