Thursday, July 31, 2008

Robert Van Order on Fannie and Freddie

When I left Madison for Washington six years ago, it was to follow my wife, who was offered a terrific job practicing geriatric medicine for under-served communities at the Washington Hospital Center. I decided to go to Freddie Mac at the time, in large part because I admired many people there, including Ed Golding, who was in charge of financial research, and Bob Van Order, who was the chief economist for many years.

Bob wrote the following on the raison d'etre for Fannie and Freddie, and with his permission, I am passing it along:


UNDERSTANDING FANNIE AND FREDDIE
By Robert Van Order
University of Aberdeen and University of Michigan
July 2008
Financial markets are different from other markets. They deal intensively in information and misinformation. Most of the time information is good enough and financial markets work fine, but when there are serious doubts about the quality of information entire blocks of investors, e.g., institutional investors who are not confident about information, exit and markets break down. In the case of lending markets borrowing rates go up abruptly and some borrowers have trouble getting loans at any price. Something like this has been happening in mortgage markets, especially subprime markets, and it seems to be spilling over into other markets.
Since the Great Depression when financial markets really went crazy we have developed institutions to try to control financial panic. A big part of this development has been deposit insurance, which provides bank depositors with assurance that they can get their money no matter what their bank does. Most of the time deposit insurance has served us very well. We don’t see bank runs to any great extent; in 1987 when the stock market crashed in a way that was not that different from 1929 we saw not a whiff of a bank panic. Of course the security has come at a cost. Banks can use deposit insurance as a basis for risk-taking and cause large costs to tax payers and distort resource allocation, as was the case with the Savings and Loans in the 1980s.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (FF) are a part of this apparatus. They are usually referred to as Government Sponsored Enterprises or “GSEs.” That is, they are enterprises (they are privately owned), but they have special charters and benefits primarily in the form of implicit guarantees, for which they do not pay, and regulation (for instance, FF are limited to the mortgage markets and have regulations on their capital and on lending to targeted groups) which constrain their operation. They buy mortgages from lenders and they fund the purchases by issuing their own debt and (most often) mortgage backed securities (securities backed by particular pools of mortgages). They take credit risk because they are responsible for paying off investors in their securities in the event of default. They also take interest rate risk to the extent their debt funding is out of sync with their assets’ cash flows. Interest rate risk has not been the issue recently, but credit risk certainly has.
The GSEs have several purposes. Much of the recent focus has been on subsidizing homeownership, but the really important function has been to provide “liquidity” to the mortgage market, which basically means that they keep the market open even when times are tough, like now. Along with this they provide an element of standardization, which helps lenders and investors better understand what they are originating and buying. They can do this in part because their implicit guarantee allows them to raise money in bad times in the same way that deposit insurance allows banks to raise money even when they are in trouble.
Guarantees involve a subsidy, if they are not paid for. In FF’s case their debt has been rated AAA or AAA+ because of the government connection; whereas on its own it has been rated in the low AA range. The difference in borrowing rates between the two is around a quarter of a percent to .40%, which is a rough measure of their subsidy. Banks get a similar subsidy, which varies from bank to bank. The subsidy is probably larger now.
The analogy with deposit insurance is deliberate. Banks are de facto GSEs. Indeed, so are most major financial institutions around the world, which is in part why we have had relatively stable financial markets for decades. That does not mean that all GSEs are good things or that regulation can’t be improved on, but we’re not in uncharted water here. Nor are we looking at unprecedented support for mortgage markets. Since at least the 1950s almost all U.S. mortgages have benefited from guarantees: initially direct insurance like FHA and deposit insurance, especially via the Savings and Loans, and more recently via GSEs. The only part of the market without substantial government presence has been the subprime market.
What we have is a trade off. The GSEs provide stability. A measure of some of the current benefit from having FF in the market can be seen from a natural experiment that comes from the way the GSEs are regulated. There is a limit on the size of loan that FF can buy (It has been changed recently; at the beginning of this year it was $417,000. The limit is indexed to house prices over time). For years the loans above this cutoff (so called “jumbo” loans) paid rates about a quarter of a per cent higher than on loans below the limit (on 30 year fixed rate mortgages). The loans above the limit are not much different from those below; they are prime loans (the borrowers have good credit histories) with similar characteristics. However, at the end of last summer, as the subprime news hit the fan, the spread rose by over 1% and has stayed in that neighborhood. Again there is nothing in the data to suggest anything like that big a difference in credit risk on these loans. The difference is due to the existence of FF as liquidity providers in their part of the market. There is every reason to believe that without FF interest rates would have gone up in a comparable manner in most of the market.
The trade off is that the GSE structure, particularly the implicit guarantee, invites risk-taking in the same way that deposit insurance invites it. This distorts resource allocation (in this case diverting resources toward housing and homeownership). Perhaps more important, politically, it risks bail-outs (like with the S and Ls in the 1980s). Both the benefits and costs of GSEs are real and need to be balanced.
Right now the two GSEs are in trouble, and it is important to understand why. We can think of their business as having two parts: the “core” business of buying and funding prime mortgages, mostly 30 year fixed rate mortgages, and a portfolio of other “non Agency” mortgage-backed securities, which are not backed by prime loans, but rather by riskier loans like subprime and “Alt-A” mortgages. FF bought pieces of subprime and Alt-A deals that had insurance and subordination (meaning there were other investors in the loan pool that took risks first (e.g., the first 15% of the pool losses), which were supposed to protect them, so their parts of the deal (tranches) were rated AAA. These have performed worse than AAA and have fallen sharply in value. The non Agency portfolio is less than 10% of the combined $5 trillion in mortgage related assets held by the two, but it has been most of the recent controversy.
The core business of FF has been experiencing large defaults, almost certainly larger than either has ever experienced. This does not appear to have been due to changes in risk-taking or growth in the companies: the prime mortgages they bought have not changed much over time, and their performance has actually been better (lower delinquency rates) that those for prime mortgages in general. Nor was excessive growth a problem; the FF market share and level of purchases dropped sharply after 2003, as the subprime share rose. As far as one can tell so far the answer to “why?” is mostly that house prices have declined faster than at any time since these two have been around (It may have been worse in the 1930s). Both companies have taken write downs from this and more is likely to come. However, while this will certainly cut sharply into profits for several years it is likely that the two will weather the storm.
How do we know this? Well, we don’t know for sure, but we can get some ideas from history. Comparable declines in prices in some recent bad regional declines suggest that there is room for quite high default rates without collapse. An underappreciated tool that the FF regulator uses to assess FF capital is a series of “stress tests, which simulate the companies’ performance under stressful (in this case large credit loss situations). While the tests are a bit complicated the principle is simple: take the worst regional experience in recent history (for which we have data; this is the “oil patch” states in the 1980s) and project it nationwide and ask if the institution has enough capital reserve to survive ten years (leaving positive capital behind). The tool has not gotten much publicity because the institutions have generally (this includes the first quarter this year) had no trouble passing . It is important in part because the stress test appears to be actually happening. It looks like the two still pass (they had considerable excess in the first quarter of this year) but not without considerable pain. They will need added capital cushions both to make sure they get through the stress and so that they can grow. This part of their problem is a little controversial, but not a lot.
It is the non agency portfolios that are the big issue. A problem in assessing the non Agency portfolio, and the economic position of the two GSEs in general, is that the two standard measures of their position—two measures of their net worth- are both wrong. Standard accounting measures are almost always wrong because they are (generally) too slow to adapt to changing economic conditions. Hence, while accounting net worth of the two has worsened as they have set aside reserves for future losses, accounting rules do not do this fast enough to anticipate the full extent of future losses, so accounting (GAAP) net worth is probably too big.
The other measure, “mark to market” net worth, which estimates the market value of assets and liabilities of the two and takes the difference as their net worth, errs in the other direction. Right now mark to market net worth is around zero or negative for the two companies, primarily because the mark to market value of the non Agency securities has fallen sharply. This has been the genesis of much of the recent news about the two. It is certainly the case that if FF had to liquidate their portfolios they would be in trouble. However, they don’t have to; they are in a position of being able to hold them and fund their assets. Normally the mark to market value would also reflect the value of holding the assets as well as the value if sold; that is how competition in the market among buyers of securities works. But that only works if the market is working.
The problem is that there has been a liquidity crunch in the “non Agency” markets for mortgage-backed securities that is worse than the one we know about and can measure in the “Jumbo” market. The market for buying these has more or less evaporated, so it is hard to get the kind of clear read on the value of the securities that we would get in a market like the one for Treasury bonds. This is what is most controversial: the argument is that the senior, would-be AAA, subprime pieces are being priced at discounts that are way above any reasonable estimate of default loss. If that is the case, then holding the securities and using the proceeds to pay off the debt that funded them has a good chance of working—certainly it is better than selling the securities into a very thin market and trying to use the proceeds to pay off the debt.
Should we worry about this? Of course, but we should not overdo. Stress test tests run by FF and by outside analysts suggest that these securities are certainly not AAA, but they are not junk bonds either, and losses will be manageable. This is probably why the Congressional Budget Office opined recently that there probably will be no cost to the recently passed “bailout” bill.
But the “probably” part matters. Things could turn south, and that could be costly. Indeed, a problem right now is that FF would get most of the upside if things improve, but Treasury (taxpayers) would be stuck with a large part of the downside. This is the balance part. Guarantees, both for GSEs and banks, give financial institutions incentives to take risks because they get the upside benefits, but not all of the downside costs, and the market does not make them pay for it. On the other hand, the situation we are facing now, a possible financial meltdown, happens infrequently, but when it does it can cause a great deal of damage, a small glimpse of which we are seeing in the Jumbo market.
The short run response, in the recent Housing Bill, to this has been to shore up the perception of a guarantee, so that it is more or less certain that FF can continue to raise money. That is what the so-called line of credit is about (Ditto for opening the Fed discount window). It gives Treasury authority to extend its ability to make secured loans to FF (at Treasury’s discretion, not FF’s). Right now it is not necessary; FF are liquid and raising money easily, but knowing that the line is there probably makes it less likely that it will be used (for the same reason that the existence of deposit insurance mitigates bank runs). A separate part of the Bill allows Treasury to buy FF stock. This makes less sense. From a public policy perspective the issue is keeping the market open, and the line of credit can do this without helping shareholders. If FF fail, the line of credit will be the main vehicle for paying off the implicit guarantee.
Longer term, the balance will most likely come from limits on risk-taking and on capital reserves. The risk-taking of FF has not been a major issue, but the capital reserve has. Reforms going forward will probably raise the minimum levels of capital. The stress tests have not been mentioned much. That is unfortunate for two reasons: One is that as house prices fall and losses get paid out the ability to withstand the stress test going forward will diminish and there will be built in need to raise capital. Second the stress tests can be revised. The 1992 law that set up FF regulation required taking the stress test from the worst regional downturn in the data. We shall surely have a region (the southwest? Florida?) from the current period that will best the oil patch states. As a result simply updating the stress test will increase required capital, and it will do it the right way—related to the risk the institutions take.
If you want to get an idea of how the two are doing, forget the accounting net worth and the mark to market net worth and look at what is happening with stress tests.
A dimension of the problem that has not been seriously addressed is that FF, like banks, do not pay for the insurance they get. A way of solving this is via user fees. Charging fees would really solidify the guarantee and take it out of the conjecture box. To some extent this is a question of the extent to which taxpayers want to subsidize mortgage rates. It is not likely to be as good a way of controlling risk as are capital requirements and stress tests.
More broadly: there are four likely ways that housing finance will get done in the U.S:
1. GSEs.
2. Non Agency (“private label”) securitization.
3. Banks (and S and Ls)
4. Government owned institutions like FHA and Ginnie Mae
These all have benefits and costs. The second is the only 100% private (without guarantee) model. It runs the risk of fragility—probably not as bad, going forward, as the subprime debacle, but at least like the current Jumbo market. The third has many similarities to the GSEs. In principle the GSEs and banks are hard to separate; in practice the GSEs have won the market, but innovations like “covered bonds” can allow banks to do almost the same thing as securitization. Both have incentives for risk-taking and risk of bail out. The fourth presents the problems of government management and inflexibility (For instance, pricing by both FHA and Ginnie Mae are fixed by statute), and it is not clear that there is less risk.
Going forward, there is no doubt that there are risks, but not the sorts of catastrophes that have been floating around the press, blogs and newsrooms. The current zero or negative mark to market net worth is more a figment of a broken market than a judgment about future prospects. In any event the last thing we should want to do now is take away the liquidity role of FF. Around 90% of all adults are homeowners at some time in their life and almost all homeowners take out a mortgage at some time. The mortgage market is important, and keeping it open is important. Sometimes you need someone to bring the punch bowl back to the party when the guests are threatening to leave.

17 comments:

Anonymous said...

All this just to subsidize GSE rates 1/3 of 1% lower than market rates? Its not worth the moral hazard, risk to the credit system, and the tax money needed to bail them out.

Anonymous said...

How much moral hazard is ok? How much corruption should a society ignore? Distressing to see so many call this moral hazard a necessary evil. Unfortunately, the tipping point is hard to call, but appears inevitable with such systems.

Sometimes a leg has to be amputated to save the patient. No chance this patient will realize that.

Anonymous said...

Congratulations to the members of Congress who passed this housing bill.

Thank God for the wealthy Congress people who had the foresight to pass this bill and take the National Debt to 10.6 Trillion Dollars.

We should remember that these are the same Congress people who will have spent over 1 Trillion Dollars on an oil war.

Let me see if I have this straight:
Freddie and Fannie will now have money to save them. These are the people who buy all the mortgages from the banks. If the wealthy and powerful banks could not sell their mortgages then they would go out of business or be accountable for their actions.
I read the other day that Fannie and Freddie have 800 billion in mortgages and those mortgages represent 60 billion in value. Thank God, we the taxpayers will only have to pay 740 billion to save Freddie and Fannie. It was either the Fannie or Freddie boss that took home 60 million in one year.
I would suggest to save money, that we combine Freddie and Fannie into the Frankenstein Mortgage Company with offices in Bad-bag Iraq.

With this bill we help the first time homeowner with $7500. Is this so that they can buy foreclosed housing which is a blessing for the wealthy and powerful Banks ?

Here is the one I like the best. It reminds me of Am Trust Bank, Cleveland Ohio, who foreclosed on my home of 7 years. This is the bank that threatened and promised me in writing that they would file a frivolous lawsuit against me for fighting my foreclosure. This is the same bank that refused to discuss the issues and the violations of law that caused the foreclosure.
Well, billions of dollars have been set aside for people that meet certain criteria to refinance their present mortgage to SAVE them from foreclosure. THEIR BANK IRONICALY HAS TO AGREE to this to make it happen. This of course involves 400,000 homeowners. What about the other millions of homeowners pending foreclosure?
Well now, these banks are the same ones that operate under the” Lynch Mob” program. The bank forecloses the home and then hangs the borrower. You see, the borrower in the USA has no RIGHT to contest or to fight their foreclosure with in the federal regulatory system, because the Congress won’t permit this to happen. Why? This protects the federally chartered savings banks.
Therefore the Bank which is regulated under the federal regulatory system operates with impunity—there are no federal consumer banking regulations. Banks accordingly conduct their mortgage lending activities knowing the borrower has no redress with in the federal regulatory system.

My question is, WHAT ABOUT THE 4 MILLION PEOPLE IN FORECLOSURE OR WHO HAVE BEEN FORECLOSURED?
Are these not the homeowners who started this foreclosure crisis? Are not these the same people who have no rights to fight their foreclosure within the same federal system that the banks in the same federal system are lending mortgage money? Can’t these homeowners fight their foreclosure doing the big dollar LEGAL DANCE? You know, the borrower’s attorney and the bank’s attorney dance before the Band (Court) until your money runs out.

And you out there who blame these homeowners that you say lived high on the hog and who demanded that the banks give them a mortgage they could understand and could not afford. You are right. No more bailouts for the lowlife home owners who were the cause of this foreclosure crisis, which made this lending system so profitable for the wealthy and the powerful. You are so righteous. You are so wrong.

Thank God for my Ohio Senators, “would you repeat that” Sherrod Brown and “which way is the wind blowing” George Voinovich for spending every cent the taxpayer has, plus 10.6 Trillion dollars that we don’t have. I can sleep well in Cleveland Ohio under the 9th Street bridge knowing that my ex attorney and the bank were at the dance having a financial wrecking ball.

This bill basically protected the entire mortgage system and the way it operates and those who profit because of the system. The Bill did not protect those among us who had nothing to gain, but everything to lose. Congress dealt a low blow to the American homeowner.

The idea was to pass something, they passed nothing.

Michael LittleBig

Anonymous said...

花蓮,租車,花蓮,花蓮旅遊景點,花蓮,一日遊,一日遊,溯溪,賞鯨,泛舟,花莲租车,租车,花莲,花莲旅游,花莲租车,租车,花莲,花莲旅游,租车,花莲,花莲旅游,租车,花莲租车,花莲,花莲旅游,花蓮,花東,租車,花蓮,花蓮,旅遊,花東,租車,花蓮,花蓮,租車,花東,花蓮,旅遊,花東,租車,花蓮,旅遊租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花東旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊,租車,花蓮旅行社,花蓮旅遊景點,花蓮旅遊行程,花蓮旅遊地圖,花蓮一日遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車旅遊網,花蓮租車,花蓮租車,花蓮租車,花東旅遊景點,租車,花蓮旅遊,花東旅遊行程,花東旅遊地圖,花蓮租車公司,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊租車,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮賞鯨,花蓮旅遊,花蓮旅遊,租車,花蓮租車,花蓮租車 ,花蓮 租車,花蓮,花蓮旅遊網,花蓮租車網,花蓮,租車,花東 旅遊,花蓮 租車,花蓮,旅遊,租車公司,花蓮,花蓮旅遊,花東旅遊,花蓮地圖,包車,花蓮,旅遊租車,花蓮 租車,租車,花蓮租車資訊網,花蓮旅遊,租車,花東,花東地圖,租車公司,租車網,花蓮租車旅遊,租車,花蓮,賞鯨,花蓮旅遊租車,花東旅遊,租車網,花蓮海洋公園,租車 ,花蓮 租車,花蓮,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車公司,租車花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車公司,花蓮一日遊,花蓮包車,花蓮租車網,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮旅行社,花東旅遊,花蓮包車,租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮一日遊,租車服務,花蓮租車公司,花蓮包車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車公司,花蓮一日遊,花蓮包車,花蓮租車網,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車公司,花蓮一日遊,花蓮租車,租車網,花蓮租車公司,花蓮旅遊,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車公司,花蓮租車公司,花蓮一日遊,租車,租車服務,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車公司,花蓮一日遊,花蓮旅遊,花蓮賞鯨,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車公司,花蓮一日遊,花蓮包車,花蓮租車網,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車公司,花蓮一日遊,租車花蓮,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車公司,花蓮一日遊,租車花蓮,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車公司,花蓮一日遊,花蓮包車,花蓮,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車公司,花蓮一日遊,花蓮包車,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車公司,花蓮一日遊,花蓮包車,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車公司,花蓮一日遊,花蓮包車,花蓮租車網,租車公司,花蓮租車,花蓮租車公司,花蓮一日遊,花蓮旅遊,花蓮旅遊租車,花蓮租車網,花蓮租車,花蓮一日遊,租車花蓮,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊租車,花蓮租車,花蓮租車旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮旅遊,花蓮包車,花蓮溯溪,花蓮泛舟,花蓮溯溪,花蓮旅遊,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,租車公司,花蓮旅遊租車,花蓮租車,租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花東旅遊,花蓮賞鯨,花蓮旅遊,花蓮泛舟,花蓮賞鯨,花蓮溯溪,花蓮泛舟,花蓮泛舟,花蓮溯溪,花蓮旅遊,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花東旅遊,花蓮,花東,花蓮旅遊,花東旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮,花東,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花東旅遊,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮,花東旅遊萬事通,花蓮旅遊,租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車,花蓮包車,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮太魯閣,花蓮包車,花東旅遊,花蓮旅遊行程,花蓮旅遊,花蓮 租車,花蓮租車,花蓮租車旅遊,花蓮旅遊租車,租車,花蓮旅遊推薦,花蓮旅遊包車,花蓮租車,花蓮,花蓮租車,花蓮地圖,花蓮旅遊,花蓮旅遊資訊網,花蓮旅遊景點,賞鯨,花蓮旅遊行程,花蓮旅遊,花蓮旅遊租車,花東旅遊景點,花東旅遊行程,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,租車,花東旅遊,花蓮旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮,旅遊達人,旅遊達人blog,花蓮租車旅遊資訊網,花蓮,租車,花蓮,花東旅遊,地圖,租車,賞鯨泛舟溯溪,租車,[ 芝麻店家 ] 花蓮租車旅遊資訊網,花蓮租車-花蓮旅遊租車資訊網 ,旅遊網,旅遊景點,花蓮行程,花蓮,花東,旅遊租車,旅遊,花蓮,租車,花東旅遊,花蓮租車旅遊,行易旅遊民宿資訊網,花蓮,旅遊,花蓮,一日遊,花蓮好玩的地方,花蓮,,一日遊,花東,租車,旅遊,花蓮旅遊,花東旅遊,花蓮租車,花蓮租車,花蓮旅遊-花東旅遊萬事通,花蓮民宿,花蓮民宿,花蓮民宿,花蓮民宿

trustme said...

Hello, wonderful blog!thank you. By the way,here we offer a lot of good nike shoes,you can come to have

a look.
nike shox r5
nike air max 180
air yeezy sneakers
tn chaussures
nike tn
tn chaussures
nike air max
sneakers
shox oz
nike shox monster
bon marche shox r5
men's nike shoes
nike shox monster
nike store
nike shox r4
nike air max
achat nike shox
cheap nike shoes
tn chaussures
nike air max
enfant chaussures
nike tn requin
nike tn
nike shox cartoon
chaussures nike shox
acheter chaussures homme
tn chaussures
chaussures sport
discount enfant chaussures

Anonymous said...

UNIWILL 258-4S4400-S1P1 Battery
TOSHIBA PA3307U-1BRS Battery
TOSHIBA PA3383U-1BRS Battery
TOSHIBA PA3384U-1BRS Battery
TOSHIBA PA3465U-1BRS Battery
Toshiba PA2487UR battery
Toshiba A100 Battery
Toshiba Satellite A105 battery
Toshiba A70 battery
PA3062U-1BAT battery
Toshiba Satellite P30 battery
Toshiba PA3084U-1BRS battery
Toshiba PA3098U battery
PA3107U-1BAS battery
PA3107U-1BRS battery
PA3166U-1BRS battery
PA3176U-1BAS battery
TOSHIBA PABAS076 Battery
Toshiba pa3399u-1brs battery
TOSHIBA PA3399U-2BAS Battery
TOSHIBA PA3421U-1BRS Battery
TOSHIBA PA3456U-1BRS Battery
TOSHIBA Pa3356u-1brs battery
Satellite a10 battery
Pa3331u-1brs battery
Satellite m30 series battery
Satellite pro m30 battery
TOSHIBA PA3399U-1BRS Battery
Portege m300 battery
TOSHIBA PA3285U-1BRS Battery

Anonymous said...

ACER TravelMate 240 Battery
ACER BT.00803.004 Battery
ACER Travelmate 4002lmi battery
Acer travelmate 800 battery
Acer aspire 3613wlmi battery
Travelmate 2414wlmi battery
Acer batcl50l battery
Acer Travelmate 2300 battery
ACER aspire 3610 battery
ACER travelmate 4600 battery
Dell Latitude D800 battery
Dell Inspiron 600m battery
Dell Inspiron 8100 Battery
Dell Y9943 battery
Dell Inspiron 1521 battery
Dell Inspiron 510m battery
Dell Latitude D500 battery
Dell Latitude D520 battery
Dell GD761 battery
Dell NF343 battery
Dell D5318 battery
Dell G5260 battery
Dell Inspiron 9200 battery
Dell Latitude C500 battery
Dell HD438 Battery
Dell GK479 battery
Dell PC764 battery
Dell KD476 Battery

Anonymous said...

Dell Inspiron 1150 battery
Dell inspiron 8500 battery
Dell Inspiron 4100 battery
Dell Inspiron 4000 battery
Dell Inspiron 8200 battery
Dell FK890 battery
Dell Inspiron 1721 battery
Dell Inspiron 1300 Battery
Dell Inspiron 1520 Battery
Dell Latitude D600 Battery
Dell XPS M1330 battery
Dell Latitude D531N Battery
Dell INSPIRON 6000 battery
Dell INSPIRON 6400 Battery
Dell Inspiron 9300 battery
Dell INSPIRON 9400 Battery
Dell INSPIRON e1505 battery
Dell INSPIRON 2500 battery
Dell INSPIRON 630m battery


Dell Latitude D820 battery
Dell Latitude D610 Battery
Dell Latitude D620 battery
Dell Latitude D630 battery
Dell xps m1210 battery
Dell e1705 battery
Dell d830 battery
Dell inspiron 2200 battery
Dell inspiron 640m battery
Dell inspiron b120 battery

Anonymous said...

Dell 310-6321 battery
Dell 1691p battery
Dell Inspiron 500m battery
Dell 6Y270 battery
Dell inspiron 8600 battery
Latitude x300 series battery
Dell latitude cpi battery
Dell 1x793 battery
dell Inspiron 1501 battery
Dell 75UYF Battery
Dell Inspiron 1720 battery
dell Latitude C640 battery
Dell XPS M140 battery
Dell Inspiron E1405 battery
dell 700m battery
dell C1295 battery
Dell U4873 Battery
Dell Latitude C600 battery
Armada E700 Series battery
Compaq 116314-001 battery
Compaq 319411-001 battery
Compaq nc4200 battery
Compaq Presario R3000 Battery
Compaq Presario 2100 battery
Compaq Presario r3000 Battery
Compaq Business Notebook NX9000 series battery
HP 395789-001 battery
HP 446506-001 Battery
HP dv9700 battery

Anonymous said...

HP F4809A Battery
HP nc8000 battery
HP nc8230 battery
HP pavilion zd8000 battery
HP f2024b battery
HP f4812a battery
HP Pavilion ZV5000 battery
HP Pavilion DV1000 battery
HP Pavilion ZD7000 Battery
HP Pavilion DV2000 battery
HP Pavilion DV4000 Battery
HP Pavilion dv6000 Battery
HP Pavilion DV9000 Battery
HP F4098A battery
HP pavilion zx6000 battery
HP omnibook xe4400 battery
HP omnibook xe4500 battery
HP omnibook xe3 battery
Notebook NX9110 battery
IBM 02K6821 battery
IBM 02K7054 battery
IBM 08K8195 battery
IBM 08K8218 battery
IBM 92P1089 battery
IBM Thinkpad 390 Series battery
IBM Thinkpad 390X battery
IBM ThinkPad Z61m Battery
IBM 02K7018 Battery
IBM thinkpad t41p battery

Anonymous said...

IBM THINKPAD T42 Battery
IBM ThinkPad R60 Battery
IBM ThinkPad T60 Battery
IBM ThinkPad T41 Battery
IBM ThinkPad T43 Battery
IBM ThinkPad X40 Battery
Thinkpad x24 battery
ThinkPad G41 battery
IBM thinkpad r52 battery
Thinkpad x22 battery
IBM thinkpad t42 battery
IBM thinkpad r51 battery
Thinkpad r50 battery
IBM thinkpad r32 battery
Thinkpad x41 battery
SONY VGP-BPS2 Battery
SONY VGP-BPS2C Battery
SONY VGP-BPS5 battery
SONY VGP-BPL2C battery
SONY VGP-BPS2A battery
SONY VGP-BPS2B battery
SONY PCGA-BP1N battery
SONY PCGA-BP2E battery
SONY PCGA-BP2NX battery
SONY PCGA-BP2S battery
SONY PCGA-BP2SA battery
SONY PCGA-BP2T battery
SONY PCGA-BP2V battery

Anonymous said...

FUJITSU lifebook t4010 Battery
FUJITSU lifebook t4020d Battery
GATEWAY NX7000 battery
UNIWILL 258-4S4400-S1P1 Battery
TOSHIBA PA3307U-1BRS Battery
TOSHIBA PA3383U-1BRS Battery
TOSHIBA PA3384U-1BRS Battery
TOSHIBA PA3465U-1BRS Battery
Toshiba PA2487UR battery
Toshiba A100 Battery
Toshiba Satellite A105 battery
Toshiba A70 battery
PA3062U-1BAT battery
Toshiba Satellite P30 battery
Toshiba PA3084U-1BRS battery
Toshiba PA3098U battery
PA3107U-1BAS battery
PA3107U-1BRS battery
PA3166U-1BRS battery
PA3176U-1BAS battery
TOSHIBA PABAS076 Battery
Toshiba pa3399u-1brs battery
TOSHIBA PA3399U-2BAS Battery
TOSHIBA PA3421U-1BRS Battery
TOSHIBA PA3456U-1BRS Battery
TOSHIBA Pa3356u-1brs battery
Satellite a10 battery

Anonymous said...

ACER aspire 5560 battery
ACER BATBL50L6 battery
ACER TravelMate 240 Battery
ACER BT.00803.004 Battery
ACER Travelmate 4002lmi battery
Acer travelmate 800 battery
Acer aspire 3613wlmi battery
Travelmate 2414wlmi battery
Acer batcl50l battery
Acer Travelmate 2300 battery
ACER aspire 3610 battery
ACER travelmate 4600 battery
Dell Latitude D800 battery
Dell Inspiron 600m battery
Dell Inspiron 8100 Battery
Dell Y9943 battery
Dell Inspiron 1521 battery
Dell Inspiron 510m battery
Dell Latitude D500 battery
Dell Latitude D520 battery
Dell GD761 battery
Dell NF343 battery
Dell D5318 battery
Dell G5260 battery
Dell Inspiron 9200 battery
Dell Latitude C500 battery
Dell HD438 Battery
Dell GK479 battery
Dell PC764 battery
Dell KD476 Battery
Dell Inspiron 1150 battery
Dell inspiron 8500 battery
Dell Inspiron 4100 battery

Anonymous said...

Dell Inspiron 4000 battery
Dell Inspiron 8200 battery
Dell FK890 battery
Dell Inspiron 1721 battery
Dell Inspiron 1300 Battery
Dell Inspiron 1520 Battery
Dell Latitude D600 Battery
Dell XPS M1330 battery
Dell Latitude D531N Battery
Dell INSPIRON 6000 battery
Dell INSPIRON 6400 Battery
Dell Inspiron 9300 battery
Dell INSPIRON 9400 Battery
Dell INSPIRON e1505 battery
Dell INSPIRON 2500 battery
Dell INSPIRON 630m battery
Dell Latitude D820 battery
Dell Latitude D610 Battery
Dell Latitude D620 battery
Dell Latitude D630 battery
Dell xps m1210 battery
Dell e1705 battery
Dell d830 battery
Dell inspiron 2200 battery
Dell inspiron 640m battery
Dell inspiron b120 battery
Dell xps m1210 battery
Dell inspiron xps m1710 battery
Dell inspiron 1100 battery
Dell 310-6321 battery

Anonymous said...

Dell 1691p battery
Dell Inspiron 500m battery
Dell 6Y270 battery
Dell inspiron 8600 battery
Latitude x300 series battery
Dell latitude cpi battery
Dell 1x793 battery
dell Inspiron 1501 battery
Dell 75UYF Battery
Dell Inspiron 1720 battery
dell Latitude C640 battery
Dell XPS M140 battery
Dell Inspiron E1405 battery
dell 700m battery
dell C1295 battery
Dell U4873 Battery
Dell Latitude C600 battery
Armada E700 Series battery
Compaq 116314-001 battery
Compaq 319411-001 battery
Compaq nc4200 battery
Compaq Presario R3000 Battery
Compaq Presario 2100 battery
Compaq Presario r3000 Battery
Compaq Business Notebook NX9000 series battery
HP 395789-001 battery
HP 446506-001 Battery
HP dv9700 battery
HP F4809A Battery
HP nc8000 battery
HP nc8230 battery
HP pavilion zd8000 battery

Anonymous said...

Thinkpad x24 battery
ThinkPad G41 battery
IBM thinkpad r52 battery
Thinkpad x22 battery
IBM thinkpad t42 battery
IBM thinkpad r51 battery
Thinkpad r50 battery
IBM thinkpad r32 battery
Thinkpad x41 battery
SONY VGP-BPS2 Battery
SONY VGP-BPS2C Battery
SONY VGP-BPS5 battery
SONY VGP-BPL2C battery
SONY VGP-BPS2A battery
SONY VGP-BPS2B battery
SONY PCGA-BP1N battery
SONY PCGA-BP2E battery
SONY PCGA-BP2NX battery
SONY PCGA-BP2S battery
SONY PCGA-BP2SA battery
SONY PCGA-BP2T battery
SONY PCGA-BP2V battery
SONY PCGA-BP4V battery
SONY PCGA-BP71 battery
SONY PCGA-BP71A battery
SONY VGP-BPL1 battery
SONY VGP-BPL2 battery
Sony vgn-t2xp/s battery
Sony vaio vgn-s4xp battery
Sony vaio pcg-z1rsp battery

Anonymous said...

SONY NP-FT1 battery
SONY NP-FC10 Battery
SONY NP-F330 Battery
SONY NP-F550 Battery
SONY NP-FM50 Battery
SONY NP-FP50 Battery
SONY NP-55 Battery
SONY NP-FM70 Battery
SONY NP-33 Battery
SONY NP-F970 Battery
SONY NP-FP90 Battery
FUJITSU Lifebook C2220 battery
FUJITSU Fpcbp63 Battery
FUJITSU Fpcbp68 Battery
FUJITSU Fpcbp77 Battery
FUJITSU Fpcbp78 Battery
FUJITSU Fpcbp79 Battery
FUJITSU Fpcbp95 Battery
FUJITSU Fpcbp98 Battery
FUJITSU Fpcbp121 Battery
FUJITSU Fpcbp151 Battery
FUJITSU lifebook t4010 Battery
FUJITSU lifebook t4020d Battery
GATEWAY NX7000 battery
UNIWILL 258-4S4400-S1P1 Battery
TOSHIBA PA3307U-1BRS Battery
TOSHIBA PA3383U-1BRS Battery
TOSHIBA PA3384U-1BRS Battery
TOSHIBA PA3465U-1BRS Battery