Reposting from my Forbes blog: the debate on Debt and GDP

My two cents:

Within the past day or so, economics conversations have been all about Rogoff and Reinhart and their critics, Herndon, Ash and Pollin.  The Rogoff and Reinhart (RR) paper purported to show that countries with more debt grow more slowly than countries with less; Herndon, Ash and Pollen (HAP) show that Rogoff and Reinhart’s data contains mistakes, and there is not much dispute about whether Herndon, Ash and Pollin’s corrections are right–they are.

HAP also do a pretty good job of showing that connections between debt to gdp ratio are not robust–they are sensitive to time period and country.  But they do not ask the question about direction of causality between debt and growth (page 3):

For the purposes of this discussion, we follow RR in assuming that causation runs from public debt to GDP growth. RR concludes, “At the very minimum, this would suggest that traditional debt management issues should be at the forefront of public policy concerns” (RR 2010a p. 578). In other work (see, for example, Reinhart and Rogo (2011)), Reinhart and Rogo acknowledge the potential for reverse causality, i.e., that weak economic growth may increase debt by reducing tax revenue and increasing public expenditures. RR 2010a and 2010b, however, make clear that the implied direction of causation runs from public debt to GDP growth.

But the question of direction matters a lot.  Consider a country whose GDP weakens–both tax revenues fall and social spending (on things like unemployment insurance) rises.  This means that in the absence of a policy change, weak GDP leads to higher debt.

There is a simple way to take a first cut at the question of direction of causation–by using a technique known as Granger Causality.  The set up is to try to explain something (such as GDP growth) by looking at its own lagged values and the lagged values of another variable (such as debt-to-GDP ratio).  I took the  data set in Herndon, Ash and Pollen and ran Granger tests using one lag explaining real GDP growth and debt-to-GDP ratios; I ran separate regressions for each country in the data set. I tested for significance at the 90 percent level of confidence.  I am happy to share my results with anyone who is interested (richarkg@usc.edu).

In the tests where I was exploring whether debt-to-GDP “caused” GDP growth, I found that debt’s impact was negative in five countries (Austria, Germany,Italy, Japan and Portugal); positive in four countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway), and zero in 11 countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US; although France was close to being statistically negative).

RR emphasize that there is a critical point at which debt becomes toxic, and that is at a debt-to-GDP ratio of more than 90 percent.  Doing Granger tests using this variable (on “on-off switch” for a country being at greater than 90 percent), we find that the impact of greater than 90 percent debt on GDP growth is positive in two cases (Australia and New Zealand), and is not statistically different from zero in eight cases (Belgium, Canada, Greece, Ireland, Japan, the UK and the US).  Ten countries have not had debt-to-GDP ratios above 90 percent.

When we look in the other direction, however, the impact of GDP growth on debt is negative 12 times (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, and Sweden) and is not statistically different from zero in the eight other countries (Canada, France, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the UK and the US).  Reverse causality IS a big issue here, and until it is really sorted out, we can’t say what the true, structural relationship between GDP and debt really is.

Please follow me to Forbes

I am at http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardgreen/2013/03/13/california-has-a-shortage-of-rental-housing/.

Why not worry about the deficit right now?

Because if I did my math right, Federal Government interest payments are at a long-term low relative to GDP. [Update, after looking more closely, I see that the source of the data--the US Treasury--includes state and local interest payments as well]. Consider the chart below:

Federal Government Interest Expense on Debt Outstanding Relative to GDP

The numerator is annual Federal Government interest payments, which come from here.  I am pretty sure these numbers are in nominal dollars.  The denominator comes from the BEA, and is in nominal dollars. Years are fiscal years.

Note that interest rates would have to double for us to be in the situation we were in the late 1980s, the end of the (ahem) Reagan Administration.  Do we ultimately need a steady state in which debt to GDP doesn't rise?  Absolutely.  Just not tomorrow.

The American People agree with George Orwell

This video presents what the American people consider to be the ideal wealth distribution.  At 2:47, the narrator notes that under this ideal distribution, "the wealthiest folks are about 10 to 20 times better off than the poorest Americans."

George Orwell in Why I Write:

2. Incomes. Limitation of incomes implies the fixing of a minimum wage, which implies a managed internal currency based simply on the amount of consumption goods available. And this again implies a stricter rationing scheme than is now in operation. It is no use at this stage of the world's history to suggest that all human beings should have exactly equal incomes. It has been shown over and over again that without some kind of money reward there is no incentive to undertake certain jobs. On the other hand the money reward need not be very large. In practice it is impossible that earnings should be limited quite as rigidly as I have suggested. There will always be anomalies and evasions. But there is no reason why ten to one should not be the maximum normal variation. And within those limits some sense of equality is possible. A man with Ј3 a week and a man with £1,500 a year can feel themselves fellow creatures, which the Duke of Westminster and the sleepers on the Embankment benches cannot.

Good for Greg Mankiw...

..for supporting marriage equality.

Why is the luxury housing market recovering so well?

The fashionable thing to say is because of foreign money.  I suspect the actual reason is that the one percent have gotten 122 percent of the recovery (h/t/ Tim Noah).

The demand curve for housing among the rich has shifted out.

The future of efficient transportation

Might look like this:

I heard a lecture from Alain Bertaud on how networked, scheduled transportation is not a good solution for many people--even in poor parts of the world.  And I can testify that auto rickshaws are often the best way to get around cities in India--they are quick, cheap, and when fueled by natural gas, environmentally not too bad (those with two stroke engines are a whole other matter).

One of the most provocative things I learned from Alain is that buses are often less fuel efficient than cars--for a bus system to work, they have to run at periods where demand is fairly low.     As it happens, while sitting at dinner in downtown Los Angeles last night, we watched bus after bus on 6th Street go by nearly empty.

Where's the monopsony?

President Obama, Paul Krugman and Robert Reich have all been pushing for an increase in the minimum wage.  I want to agree with them, and Krugman is certainly correct that the preponderance of empirical evidence shows that the minimum wage's impact on total employment is negligible.

But the question is, why?  Krugman's statement that human beings are not Manhattan apartments is true, and allows him to support the minimum wage while being appropriately skeptical of rent control, but it doesn't give a satisfactory answer as to why putting a floor on the price of labor would not create excess supply of labor.

There is in economic theory a set of circumstances, however, under which an increase in the minimum wage might raise employment.  If an employer has a market largely to itself--if it has monopsony power--then it will both pay its workers less than their productivity warrants and not hire enough workers to be at the most efficient level of employment.  Raising the minimum wage would then both increase pay and induce more workers into the labor market, hence increasing employment.  If government could nail the minimum wage to the marginal revenue product of the least productive  workers, the minimum wage could produce a first-best outcome--one where pay and employment levels were efficient.

For the argument to work, the demand for labor needn't be perfectly monopsonistic, but rather less than perfectly competitive.  The fact that wages and labor productivity seem to have less and less to do with each other is evidence that the demand for labor is not competitive, but it would be nice to have further, detailed evidence of the industrial organization of labor demand.  

Should college be subsidized?

Mark Thoma has a very nice piece today about how Cal State-Chico changed his life.  One of the reasons it changed his life is that he could afford it--it cost $100 per semester when he went there.  The story is heartwarming, to say the least.

I have always struggled with how much college should be subsidized.  People who go to college almost certainly create positive externalities, and so Pigou would say there should be some subsidy.  But people who go to college also earn substantially more over their lifetimes than those who don't.  Low income people who pay state sales taxes thus subsidize high income people.  Hence the idea that people graduate with debt seems reasonable to me, because the value they get from college far exceeds what they need to invest in college, and it means they are reducing the tax burden of those who don't go to college [I should note that I was among the lucky people whose parents paid for college, so perhaps I am in no position to comment].  On the other hand, if high prices keep 18 year olds from going to college, one of the most important routes to social mobility is blocked.

In any event, a government economist friend of mine has the obvious solution to the problem of the regressive nature of subsidizing college: progressive taxes.  

Will smart phones be the end of built in automobile NAV systems?

Four years ago, my wife bought me car for my birthday.  She reasoned that as a newly minted Angeleno, I would be spending more time in my car than ever before (she was right), and so that I might tire of my slightly beat-up Corolla.

She got me a Honda Accord with all the trimmings, including a NAV device, which I enjoyed very much.  And four years later, I continue to love the car.  But I recently downloaded WAZE to my phone.  WAZE provides crowd-sourced information on traffic, and allows one to find the fastest route from place to place with remarkable dependability.  It provides turn by turn directions, but will change the directions on the fly when traffic conditions change, a regular feature of life in LA.

WAZE is, by the way, a free app.  It also takes us one small step closer to self-driving cars.  By guess is the built-in NAV system, as it currently exists, is a dinosaur.

Bankers and tail events

I participated in a panel last note hosted by the German American Business Association.  Overall, I had a nice time.

But before the panel, a managing director from a very large bank gave a speech, and he was trying to make some sort of point about tail risk.  The example he used is going to jail in Monopoly, an event for which the average probability is four percent.

Maybe I am being picky here, but two points.  One: four percent is not that far out on the tail.  I suppose it would be good if banks tried to avoid things that happen four percent of the time or less.  Two, and more important: random events in Monopoly come from a finite state space, so risk can be completely characterized.  We know with a great deal of certainly the probabilities of particular events happening in Monopoly.

Banks have to deal with uncertainty--random shocks that are not easily characterized by well defined distributions of outcomes.  The Monopoly metaphor is thus a bad one.

Does Modigliani-Miller apply to countries?

If it does, the capital structure of the US is just fine.  Current GDP is 15.8 trillion.  Let's apply a  real discount rate of 4 percent (which is probably high, given that the yield on 10-years TIP is negative), and assume a real long-term growth of 2 percent (which is likely low).  This means the country is worth about $316 trillion (this figure includes human capital as well as asset values).

Total debt outstanding in the US, public and private, is $55 trillion.  So we are about 17 percent debt funded, which means we are about 83 percent equity funded.  This should be OK.  What I am missing here?

(note: it was Matthew Yglesias' Slate piece today that got me thinking along these lines).

  

Steve Oliner shows that it takes too damn long to build things in California

The set-up:

Recent research, which I conducted with Jonathan Millar of the Federal Reserve Board and Daniel Sichel of Wellesley College..... presents the first comprehensive estimates of planning times for commercial construction projects across the United States. We analyze roughly 82,000 projects nationwide for which planning was initiated  between 1999 and 2010, using data obtained from CBRE Econometric Advisors/Dodge Pipeline. The projects in the dataset include office buildings, retail stores, warehouses, and hotels. About 95 percent of these projects involve the construction of a new building; the remainder are additions or alterations to an existing building or conversions to a new use.

They find that average planning time in the US for a commercial building is 17 months.   But the longest planning times are in California and the Northeast.  Planning times in some California MSAs are about a year longer than the national average.  This makes California's economy less nimble than others.

This is not about whether or not there should be strong rules to protect the environment--California needs such rules.  This is about making rules straightforward and predictable, and allowing economic agents to behave quickly within the rules.  My hypothesis is that it is California's clumsy implementation of planning, more than anything else, that puts it at a needless disadvantage relative to Texas.

It's the G.

After I saw the weak 4th quarter GDP number reported this morning, I went to the National Income and Products Accounts website, where I found that in the 4th quarter, government expenditures and investment has declined by 6.6 percent on a seasonally adjusted annualized rate and that defense spending had dropped 22.2 percent, again, on a SAAR.

Can this possibly be correct?  I am wondering if there is some anomaly in the data.

An update of my tinker-toy model of housing starts and GDP

We had pretty robust growth in housing starts in December:

A few months ago, I suggested that we could have second quarter GDP growth of 2.9 percent.  I am now revising that to greater than 3 percent growth (the point estimate is 3.2 percent).  We'll see how things turn out....

I didn't think Phil Mickelson's Tax Rate Could be > 60 percent

From the Tax Foundation:

Mickelson lives outside of San Diego so he is subject to one of the highest tax rates in the country, but it doesn’t appear to be quite that high.  Gerald Prante and Austin John total up all the top tax rates on wage income in the 50 states and they do find California has the highest at 51.9 percent:

"For example, the 51.9% top METR [marginal effective tax rate] for wage income in California for 2013 under the Fiscal Cliff scenario is equal to the 39.6% federal income tax rate plus the new 13.3% top state income tax rate in California minus the deductibility of state taxes against one’s federal taxes (5.27%) plus the marginal tax rate effect of Pease returning (1.18%) plus the current 1.45% Medicare employee tax plus the new 0.9% tax on Medicare plus the current 1.45% Medicare employer tax which we assume is borne by workers in the form of reduced after-tax wages. The sum of these tax rates, which equals 52.6%, is then divided by 1.0145 (1 + Medicare employer tax) because by assuming that the incidence of the Medicare employer tax is borne by workers, we must add back the employer contribution to the worker’s income. The final METR figure is thereby 51.9%."

It’s not clear how Mickelson is getting to 62 percent, since there is no other income tax at the local level in or around San Diego. 

Do higher marginal tax rates lead superstar athletes to play less often?

Let's think, for a moment, about why people want more money:

(1) To buy stuff.

(2) To keep score.

(3) To accumulate power.

Perhaps there are others, but these seem to me to be the big three.

OK, so there seem to be two kinds of athletes in the world (with respect to consumption):

(I) Those with entourages.
(II) Those without entourages.

It takes an entourage for superstar athletes to spend all the money they make--it would otherwise be hard to spend an eight figure money quickly enough (people can even afford private jets at those incomes).

So let's think about those with entourages.  If their taxes go up, they will actually have to work harder to keep their entourages.  That should mean they play more, not less.

For those without entourages, the marginal utility of consumption must be zero--this is the implication of not being able to spend all your money.  So their incentives must arise from reasons (2) and (3).

Scorekeeping is independent of taxes.  If an athlete wants to say he/she has the most winnings, they will have an incentive to play more games.

That leaves power.  Higher marginal taxes reduce the ability of high income people to accumulate power, which may mean they work/play less.  I don't know that this is entirely a bad thing. 

Morris Davis gives a talk where he shows that fewer American homeowners think they are underwater than actually are

Morris--along with Erwan Quintin--calculates median house prices by MSA using the American Community Survey from 2006-2010.  Because the ACS samples all houses, the change in price from year to year is largely not biased by the change in composition of the housing stock (the only change comes via new construction and home improvements--and the US had little of either from 2008-2010).  As such, the calculation, which is based on what people think their house is worth, is in some ways superior to house price indexes, which inevitably suffer from composition bias, even when their designers make admirable efforts to mitigate such bias.

In his talk, Morris showed that people thought the value of their houses went down substantially less than Case-Shiller implies.  Where Case-Shiller or people are right is not particularly important to mortgage performance, because people will not default if they think their house is worth more than their house.  Those who are forced to move for economic reasons might find themselves unpleasantly surprised, and may wind up selling (now) through a short-sale.  But it is possible that the reason many underwater borrowers are not walking away is that they think they are not under water.

City of New Orleans

In one of those lovely, serendipitous moments in life, I was flying over the Gulf of Mexico near New Orleans while reading Tom Fitzmorris's Hungrytown.  The city, alit at night, on the south bank of a black Lake Pontchartrain, looked beautiful, and the Fitzmorris book made me hungry as it relayed the history of the city's unique cuisine.

In the wake of Katrina, Ed Glaeser was pointed in his evaluation of New Orleans as an economic entity.

The 2000 Census reported that more than 27 percent of New Orleans residents
were in poverty (relative to 12 percent for the U.S. as a whole). Median family
income was only 64 percent of the median family income in the U.S.

In 2004, according to the American Community Survey, the unemployment rate
for the city was over 11 percent. And New Orleans’ housing prices, prehurricane,
remained far below those of the nation as a whole, providing further
evidence of weak pre-existing demand for living in the city.

By most objective measures, the city, pre-hurricane, was not doing a good job of
taking care of its poorer residents. For most students of urban distress, New
Orleans was a problem, not an ideal. Poverty and continuing economic decline
fed upon each other, delivering despair to many of the city’s residents.

In light of all this, Ed argued that providing cash to residents of New Orleans might be superior economic policy to rebuilding New Orleans.

Were he talking about any other city, I think Ed would almost certainly be right.  But somehow, it seems to me, if we were to have lost New Orleans, we as a country would have lost something beyond an economic agglomeration.  Its continuing contributions to American culture--through food and music both--have provided a positive externality to the remainder of the country that it has not been able to internalize through revenue, and the country owes it something for that.  Perhaps the cost of losing these contributions would have been less than the cost of rebuilding, but I am skeptical.

There are days when I wish Wordperfect 5.1 was still around

That is all.

Economists and the public are both right about free trade

Noahpinion has a nice post this morning on how the public doesn't trust economists.  Exhibit A:

"Free trade" is the one issue on which economists - at least, American economists - famously agree. And yet, substantial majorities of Americans think that free trade has hurt them. In the Zingales paper, trade was the issue where there was the greatest divergence between economists and the public. How can the common people disagree so sharply with the overwhelming expert consensus? Are the common people simply a bunch of flat-earthers who refuse to look at the evidence? Or do they have a point?

The workhorse model of trade is the Heckscher-Olin model.   The model predicts that trade leads to higher output for the countries that trade.  I actually think that this is hard to dispute.  But the model also predicts that when a country opens up trade, its scarcer factor of production winds up worse off.  In the case of a capital intensive country like the United States, Heckscher-Olin predicts that returns to capital will rise and returns to labor will fall.  The return to capital rising is greater than the return to labor falling, so the size of the pie increases.  Nevertheless, without redistribution, trade makes labor (particularly unskilled labor) in the US worse off.

When the US was going through the process of trade liberalization, workers were promised that the damage imposed on them would be mitigated by Trade Adjustment Assistance.  To say that the program is too small to be effective is an understatement.  The only way to effectively offset the harm done to workers via trade is with redistribution that leaves workers at least as well off as they were before trade liberalization.  Note that such redistribution would still leave owners of capital better off than they would be in the absence of liberalized trade.

I continue to have the view that on balance open trade is a good thing--among other things, it almost certainly reduces the probability of war breaking out, and this is pretty valuable in and of itself.  But when many Americans think trade has made them worse off, they are not being unreasonable.

Why Moneyball and Nate Silver work, but derivatives don't

I find Nassim Taleb's style annoying, and he often mischaracterizes the views of others.  But when I teach my mortgage backed securities course, I have my students read the Black Swan because of an important point he makes (over and over again): some things are well characterized by distribution functions with small numbers of sufficient statistics (such as mean and variance), while other things are not.

With baseball and politics, we can fully characterize the distribution of outcomes (or at least come close enough to doing so).  With financial markets, we really cannot.  What is sad is that many people disdain  the insights of statistical inference when it really works; others embrace such inference when it does not.

Will we ever learn?

Is allowing banks to count Mortgage Backed Securities as capital really a good idea?

The V-shaped nature of the Fiscal Cliff Fix

Here is a first approximation of the change in effective tax rates [for a single taxpayer] as a result of the deal (the effective rates   are based on changes in payroll and income taxes).

The builds in a 2 percentage point increase in payroll taxes us to the income cap of $110,100, and a 4.9 percentage point increase in marginal tax rates above $400,000.  The rates actually rise a teeny bit faster for those above the $400,000 threshold, because the tax on capital gains is increasing by 5 percentage points, but this doesn't change the basic point of the picture, which is that it is not until income reaches around $560,000 that the change in effective tax rates at the high end of the distribution match the rate at the low end. [note: y-axis is the change in effective tax rates].

In the glass half-full department...

(1) Grover Norquist must be pissed.

(2) If I understand the deal, Mitt Romney's taxes go up by about 33 percent.

[update: GN says he is happy because R's voted for tax cut.  Oh well].

How we are not all in it together in a small, but perhaps meaningful, way

The Rose Bowl is not longer on ABC, but rather ESPN, meaning that for someone to watch the oldest bowl game, they must be able to pay for cable TV.

One of the cliches about sports that I actually believe is that sports provide something the CEO and Custodian can talk about, thus producing social cohesion across economic classes.  But for this to be true, it need to be easy for everyone to watch.

The labor incentive effects of raising income taxes--a personal view

I like the stuff I buy.  If you raise my taxes, I will probably consult a little more so I can keep buying that stuff. This is the income effect being more important than the substitution effect.  I know that it is for me, and I am pretty sure it is for lots of others, as well.

"We are all in it together," and benefits taxes.

Tyler Cowen says that the Republican Party should propose raising taxes on everyone because, "we are all in it together."

To some extent, this is a benefits tax view--a view that we should pay to society our fair share of what we get from society.  But the implication of this is not necessarily that everyone should sacrifice in order to put us all on a sustainable fiscal path.

With Ronald Reagan's election in 1980, the US saw a sea change in tax and regulatory policy.  While the policy was suppose to benefit everyone, it clearly hasn't.  For the bottom quintile of the income distribution, income has risen about 5 percent since 1982 (the first year in which Reagan's policies bit); for the next quintile, it has risen 8 percent; for the next, 11 percent, for the next, 20 percent, and for the highest, 45 percent.  But most of the highest quintile didn't do so well--the top 5 percent has seen average household income rise by 68 percent.

These data are before tax, and come from the US Census, Table H-3.  Before anyone suggests that this means that everyone has benefited, I should point out that average income in the lowest quintile of the income distribution is $11,239, which is right at the Federal Poverty Level for a single person household.  In a benefits tax view of the world, people who haven't sufficient income to live should not be taxed (they are living at subsistence levels as it is, and taxing them makes thing worse).

So let's begin by holding the bottom quintile harmless in doing any kind of deficit reduction.  But what of the remaining quintiles?  If we look at the share of income growth by quintile (excluding the meager income growth of the bottom quintile), we find that 3 percent went to the second quintile from the bottom; 7 percent to the next; 18 percent to the next, and 73 percent to the top quintile.  So little has gone to the second and third quintile from the bottom that one could make a case that they should be left along as well.

The fourth quintile, though, has seen a material improvement in incomes, so it is probably OK to ask this group for something--this includes people who nearly everyone would consider middle class.  Nevertheless, the lion's share of the benefits of the policy changes of the early 1980s has appeared to go to the top quintile, and so the top quntile should pay the most to put us on a sustainable fiscal path.

One last calculation--the top 5 percent got 57 percent of the income growth within its quintile.

It is true that households move in and out of quintiles, but as Dalton Conley shows, not as much as we would like to think,  In any event, we have not been all in it together when it has come to benefitting from the policies of the past 30 years.

California leads

From California's Legislative Analyst's Office:

The 18th annual edition of the LAO's Fiscal Outlook--a forecast of the state's budget condition over the next five years--shows that California's budget situation has improved sharply. The state's economic recovery, prior budget cuts, and the additional, temporary taxes provided by Proposition 30 have combined to bring California to a promising moment: the possible end of a decade of acute state budget challenges. Our economic and budgetary forecast indicates that California's leaders face a dramatically smaller budget problem in 2013-14 compared to recent years. Furthermore, assuming steady economic growth and restraint in augmenting current program funding levels, there is a strong possibility of multibillion-dollar operating surpluses within a few years.

The voters of California raised taxes on themselves. Most of the revenue will come from income taxes on the top 3 percent of the income distribution; there is also a small hike in the sales tax.

Will Google, Apple, Intel, Disney, etc. run away because of this?  I rather doubt it.  And comparisons to Greece now look particularly ridiculous.

John Griffith on why Gretchen Morgenson should not trust Edward Pinto

He writes in American Banker:

The onslaught began last month after the agency released a sobering financial report, then accelerated last week when the New York Times reported on an alleged "pattern of risky lending" in the agency's mortgage insurance program.

The Times piece, penned by columnist Gretchen Morgenson, relays the findings of a controversial new report from Edward Pinto of the conservative American Enterprise Institute. Pinto's study takes on an important issue—the performance of FHA-insured home loans—but draws conclusions based on ideology rather than a cold appraisal of the facts. By relying entirely on one man's misleading data and unfounded opinions, Morgenson has done a grave disservice to a critical federal program.

The report in question argues that the FHA is "financing failure" for working-class families by peddling high-risk loans to unworthy borrowers, based on an analysis of loans insured in 2009 and 2010. Pinto concludes that the agency's basic business model—insuring long-term, low-down-payment loans to borrowers with less-than-perfect credit—puts homeowners at an unacceptably high risk of default with negative consequences for communities.

Nothing could be further from the truth....

.... Pinto focuses on the cost of foreclosure without considering the FHA's contribution to these neighborhoods since the crisis began. If FHA insurance weren't available under reasonable terms, it would have been much more difficult for low- and moderate-income families to get mortgage credit since the crisis began. As a result, home prices would have declined precipitously beyond already-depressed levels – by as much as 25%,according to one estimate from Moody’s Analytics – leading to far more foreclosures on all homes, not to mention additional job loss, lost household wealth and a far deeper or more prolonged recession.

That counter-cyclical support is a key part of the agency's mission, and it understandably comes with some costs. If the foreclosure crisis were a fire, Pinto would be blaming the firefighters for getting the house wet.

In the coming months, we hope there is a serious debate about the FHA's role in the housing market and the overall role of the government in housing finance. That will require us to sort facts from partisan nonsense, and here's hoping this report doesn't make the cut.

Matthew Yglesias says weather doesn't matter

I just caught up with his Valentine to Minneapolis:

People appear to be deterred from moving to Minneapolis on the grounds that it's very cold, but David Schkade and Daniel Kahneman have found that people's thinking about weather and happiness is dominated by "focusing illusion" in which "easily observed and distinctive differences between locations are given more weight in such judgments than they will have in reality." They specifically looked at the weather gap between California and the Midwest and found that while Midwesterners thought the good weather in California would make a huge difference in people's lives, it doesn't in reality.

OK, maybe I am idiosyncratic.  But as a person who lived most of his life in Wisconsin (not as cold as Minnesota), and who now lives in California, I can tell you the three reasons I will most likely never leave this place:

(1) My wife does cool and useful things here.
(2) I like the people I work with very much.
(3) Weather.

George Bittlingmayer on Buffet v Asness

From comments:

Under this theory, if gross-of-tax discount rates are 10% and an investment promises $10 per year, I'll plunk down $100 for it if tax rates are zero, and $100 if tax rates are 50% and I get only $5 per year. "To be tested." Recall also, if tax rates are on nominal returns, with even moderate inflation, the tax falls on what is a compensation for inflation. The effect of higher taxes seems like an empirical question, with all due respect to both Buffett & Asness, and Richard.

I agree, it is testable.  One thing that makes testing tough, though, is trying to figure out how the market discount rate change as a result of tax policy.  IN any event my principal criticism of Asness is that if you are going to change the numerator, you also need to change the denominator.

Hannah Green in Think Progress on trash

She writes:

In India, there is a thriving market for trash. People make lives for themselves collecting it, sorting it, buying it, selling it: making it useful once again.

While the community of trash workers occasionally gets attention from the American media, the focus often revolves around the initial realization that people can earn a living from garbage piles, and what this says about poverty levels.

Katherine Boo’s recent book related to the subject, Behind the Beautiful Forevers, went deeper, exploring the mechanisms of entrepreneurship and exploitation in India. However, there is also a more positive side to this story that often goes uncommented on. An efficient recycling system has a long-term positive effect on society as a whole, and is also something that North America and Europe generally lack. That is a significant part of what the trash economy in India is- an informal recycling system.

Who is right: Clifford Asness or Warren Buffet?

In a Wall Street Journal piece this morning, a man named Clifford Asness says that Warren Buffet is wrong when he says the impact of taxes on investment decisions is very small.  His argument:

Consider how every business-school student, investment banker and investment analyst on Earth has been taught to choose whether to invest in a specific project or company. You make a spreadsheet (a napkin will do sometimes). You put in your best guess of the future cash flows, and you discount those cash flows back to the present at some required rate of return you believe reflects the risk entailed. Of course, opinions about the future cash flows and the proper discount rate can vary widely, but the essential methodology is ubiquitous.

Now here's the kicker: Nobody who pays taxes and has ever done this exercise has failed (while sober) to use after-tax cash flows in this calculation. Somewhere in the spreadsheet there is a number, say 20%, or 28%, or a Gallic 75%, representing the taxes you'll pay on the assumed cash flow—and you only count the amount you'll get after paying this tax. If you turn the tax rate up high enough, projects or companies that looked like good investments become much less attractive and vice versa.

Here is the problem with this argument--it focuses on the numerator of the discounted cash flow calculation, but not the denominator.  The denominator contains the discount rate, which is the opportunity cost of capital.  One can do an analysis based on before tax cash flows, in which case the denominator is the before tax OCC.  The formula for before tax cash flow valuation is

Where CF is cash flow subscripted by time t,  r is the discount rate, and E is the expectations operator.

But if one is going to take taxes out of the denominator, he must also take it out of the numerator.  This means the ATDCF formula needs to be

The greek letter τ is the marginal income tax rate.  If we examine this formula, we see that for small t, value does in fact decline with an increase in taxes.  But now let us approximate a long term investment by looking at the perpetual annuity formula--one that has a constant cash flow for infinite t.

Now the formula for before tax valuation becomes:

Analogously, the formula for after tax valuation becomes:

Of course, the (1-τ) divides through, so the after tax and before tax values are the same.

But here is where I will add a kicker of my own: if it is really true that fiscal issues as creating uncertainty, resolving those issues should reduce the discount rate, and thus encourage investment.  People such as Mr. Asness should welcome greater certainty, and the investment opportunities it will doubtless induce.

Hannah Green in Thinkprogress on Renewable Energy in India

She writes:

This August, power shortages in India that left 300 million in the dark made it very clear that one of the world’s fastest growing economies was facing an energy crisis. Less clear is how realistically to solve it. Many firms are looking for new sources of oil to fulfill India’s growing energy demands, but this could prove to be painfully expensive.  On the brighter side, solar energy and other renewable resources are already being rapidly harnessed in the non-Western world, and they are becoming cheaper and cheaper.
As of June 2012, 31 percent of India’s energy came from renewable resources, including hydroelectric power, while only 9 percent of the United States’ did as of the end of 2011. In a 2009 McKinsey & Company survey, India was rated the top producer of solar energy in the world, just above the United States, with an annual yield of 1,700 to 1,900 kilowatt hours per kilowatt peak (kWh/KWp). However, demand for energy in India will only continue to grow, and the question is whether energy will continue to come mainly from fossil fuels or from renewable energy sources...

The housing cycle is the business cycle--again

Ed Leamer said so.  I said so.  And I continue to think it so.

Run a simple bi-directional Granger Causality model of change in residential investment and GDP.  It turns out a model with one and three lags best fits the data going back to 1969.  That model's four quarter forecast for GDP growth is 2.6, 2.5, 2.1 and 2.5 percent; for residential investment growth is 6.2, 5.0, 4.9 and 4.9 percent.  (BTW, the model passes the stationarity test).

But residential investment has grown by between 8.5 and 20 percent over the past four quarters.  Let's say that an exogenous shock (kids moving out of their parents' houses) leads residential investment to grow by 10 percent.  The forecast for GDP growth now increases to 2.6, 2.9, 2.6 and 2.9, or about .4 percentage points higher than the baseline case.  This increase in GDP reflects more than the direct impact of residential investment on GDP.

What is Apple's objective function?

Walter Isaacson's biography of Steve Jobs is a lot of fun--at least in part because it is not a hagiography.

One of the most striking things about the book is that Jobs never pushed profit maximization per se--he pushed "great products."  When John Scully pushed out Jobs and ran the company, he did push profit maximization--and Apple nearly went out of business.  Re-enter Jobs with his products-first philosophy, and Apple eventually becomes the most valuable company in history.

When economists model firms, we inevitably assume profit maximization, and then allow firms to compete either through price or quality.  The exception to this is a principal-agent set-up, where managers are seeking to maximize their own compensation.  But this doesn't really work for Apple, where Jobs was both a principal and an agent.

Maybe none of this matters--that making great products is a sufficiently strong proxy for profit maximization.  But Job's desire to make great products led him to care a lot less about cost minimization than, say, Dell--the chapter on how fanatical Jobs was about the plastic case molding for the original Macintosh underscores how Jobs tended not to think about marginal revenue and marginal cost when making decisions.

It turns out Harry Hopkins didn't say it

After Mitt Romney's "gifts" comments, I couldn't help but remember that I thought FDR advisor and WPA director Harry Hopkins said "we shall tax and tax, and spend and spend, and elect and elect."  But it turns out this is likely apocryphal--indeed, Hopkins denied having said any such thing.

Here is a nice chronology from Bartleby:

AUTHOR:	Harry Lloyd Hopkins (1890–1946)
QUOTATION:	We shall tax and tax, and spend and spend, and elect and elect.
ATTRIBUTION:	Attributed to HARRY L. HOPKINS, administrator of the Works Progress Administration.   Although Frank R. Kent mentioned the subject of “spending, taxes, and election” in reference to Hopkins in his column, “The Great Game of Politics” (Baltimore, Maryland, Sun, September 25, 1938, pp. 1, 16) he first attributed “we are going to spend and spend and spend, and tax and tax and tax, and elect and elect and elect” to Hopkins in the Sun, October 14, 1938, p. 15.   Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner in their column, “The Capital Parade” (Washington, D.C., Evening Star, November 9, 1938, p. A–11), elaborated Hopkins’s “probably apocryphal” words to: “Now, get this through your head. We’re going to spend and spend and spend, and tax and tax and tax, and re-elect and re-elect and re-elect, until you’re dead or forgotten.”   Arthur Krock, in his column, “In the Nation” (The New York Times,November 10, 1938, p. 26), reported the wording as “we will spend and spend, and tax and tax, and elect and elect.” He also repeated this wording in an article in The New York Times, November 13, 1938, sec. 4, p. E–3. A letter by Hopkins denying this attributed quotation and a response by Krock were published in The New York Times, November 24, 1938, p. 26.   Over the years the quotation attributed to Hopkins has evolved into the wording above.

Karen Chapple on the most reasonable way to create affordable housing

Housers need to listen to this:

The myth that taxes are too complicated for the typical American

I was listening to David Walker on the radio this morning, and he was going on about how tax preparation is too complicated for the vast majority of Americans.  This didn't seem right to me, so I went to the IRS SOI data Table 1.2 to see how many American's qualified for the 1040A return (a two-page form) or the 1040EZ return (a one page form).

The answer: of the 140 million tax returns filed in 2009, 90 million were filed by taxpayers that had adjusted gross income of less than $100,000 and that used the standard deduction.  These taxpayers qualify for using the 1040A or1040EZ.  So for more than 3/5 of US taxpayers, filing is not complicated at all.

Is the tax code too complicated for the other 50 million and for corporations?  Almost certainly.  But it is not a problem that afflicts the "vast majority" of Americans.

[update: according to this source, 32 percent of filers use 1040A or 1040EZ]

Mark Thoma suggests that Sheila Bair could be the next Treasury Secretary

He talks about the Fed and Treasury here.  Bair would be a superb choice.

Coastlines and votes

President Obama did better on the coasts and the Great Lakes states than elsewhere.  I thought it would be fun to plot coastline/shoreline miles by state against Obama vote percentage in 2012.  Here is what I got:

The data on coastline/shoreline come from http://www.michigan.gov/deq/0,4561,7-135-3313_3677-15959--,00.html and The Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table 364.  Vote totals come from Dave Leip's Atlas of Presidential Elections.  The correlation is .22, so not huge, but not nothing either.

If one adds Alaska, with its 6000+ miles of coastline and support of Romney, the correlation goes to zero.

Who is doing the shopping?

I was listening to a retailer last week discuss the interaction between housewives and grocery stores.  The tone of his remarks suggested that he thought housewives were grocery stores' principal customers.

This didn't seem right to me, so I tabulated the Family Type and Employment variable in the 2006-2010 sample of the American Community Sample (having a laptop with flash memory is pretty awesome--it allowed me to do it in about five minutes).

Here are the results:


Household Type                                           # of Households         % 0f Households

Married Couple, both in labor force|           22,309,285                           41.16      
Married Couple, only man in labor force      8,792,744                           16.22      
Married Couple, only woman in labor force 2,933,758                            5.41      
Married Couple, neither in labor force          6,473,742                          11.94      
Male only, in labor force                               2,848,830                            5.26      
Male only, not in labor force                            720,066                            1.33      
Female only, in labor force                            7,230,003                          13.34      
Female only, not in labor force                       2,890,776                           5.33    

I am guessing that most retailers know and understand the implications of a country where only 16 percent of households have housewives (in the traditional sense of the word), but perhaps they are not.

I am not thrilled...

..that President Obama has made Tim Geithner the point person for budget negotiations. I very much hope he doesn't negotiate away the President's strong position.

Remarks to USC Alumni Association

Another thought on Nate Silver

If poll errors are randomly distributed across states, then Obama has it won.  But if they are not, Romney still had a chance.   If how voters break is one state relative to polls is correlated with how they break in others, then if they break toward Obama, it makes no difference to the ultimate win-lose outcome; but if they break toward Romney, it does make a difference.

So statistical independence in errors across polls is good for Obama; correlation is bad for him.

I was wondering about Nate Silver's confidence intervals.

There is a nice discussion here.